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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Throughout history there have been supporters both 
for the use of revolutionary violence and of radical non-
violence as the proper means for the resolution of severe 
political conflicts. Some have even exalted violence, and 
some have utterly decried it. Some, while holding the 
violence of war justified, nevertheless are usually concious 
of the many irrational acts that occur in war. Thucydides, 
for example, for all his concessions to the common need for 
war, agreed that men would commit acts in war which they 
never would contemplate in peace; "As usually happens at 
such times, there was no length to which violence did not 
go; sons killed their fathers, and suppliants were dragged 
from the altar or slain on it. 11 1 
In recent years, the issues of war and peace have 
been debated with an increased urgency. Some policy 
analysts, for example, have argued for increases in the 
defense budget, and, in fact, a multi-billion dollar "star 
wars" project (the Stragtegic Defense Initiative) is on the 
drawing board. On the other hand, a substantial number of 
activists continue to be arrested for protesting the testing 
of nuclear weapons, the construction of Trident submarines, 
and the research and development of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative. Furthermore, various religious communities have 
1 
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attempted to begin a moral re-evaluation of the defense 
build-up in the United States. Some, such as the U. s . 
catholic Bishops, have sharply criticized the policies of 
the defense department, while hesitating to issue an 
outright condemnation of deterrence, the bedrock of U.S. 
defense policy. Other religious groups have condemned U.S. 
militarization, rejected deterrence, and have called for an 
immediate reduction in armaments.2 
In keeping with the spirit of this debate, this 
paper will examine, compare, and contrast, the moral 
positions of four charismatic thinkers on violence and non-
violence. The figures chosen for this paper--Tolstoy, 
Gandhi, Lenin, and Fanon--all are charismatic figures who 
never fully systematized their positions. The aim in this 
paper will be to articulate the moral and factual 
assumptions presupposed in their thought, and, where 
appropriate, determine the implicit logic in their 
charismatic appeals. The exposition, analysis, and 
evaluation of their appeals will serve as a heuristic device 
to generate questions and areas that need further study and 
investigation. The articulation of these considerations 
will occur in the concluding chapter. 
Before moving into the body of this study, a 
clarification of significant terms is in order. These terms 
include violence, force, coercion, and non-violence. First, 
we need to establish the meaning of the term "violence." We 
can begin by looking at the term etymologically. 
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Viol is 
the la tin root for "rape;" indeed, the spanish infinitive 
"violar" means "to rape." This makes sense, for violence 
seems to have something to do with violation, namely, the 
doing of harm or injury to another. Sergio Cotta calls 
violence the "function of despise", the "disprice", the 
taking away of the price or value of a situation, 
institution, or person, and the opposite of respect. 
Respect, here, involves a conception of the human person 
which involves profound acceptance of the Other in a 
reciprocal relationship.3 Violence is its opposite. 
Another way of looking at this phenomenon involves 
the concept of inalienable rights; that is, those rights 
indissolubly connected with being human. Principal among 
these rights are two; first, the right to one's body. 
Without a body, the man or woman could not be a person. The 
second of these rights involves the concept of dignity, and 
may be defined as the right to personal autonomy. 4 Such 
natural rights help to constitute what it means to be human; 
and acts that militate against these natural rights 
constitute violence. 
There are many kinds of violent acts; and in fact 
violent acts are not easy to categorize. The most obvious 
category is physical violence. This would include such acts 
as mugging, beating, raping, and killing, in short, any 
doing of harm to another person's body without his or her 
consent. 
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In one sense, the height of physical violence 
would be war, with so many people's bodies being harmed at 
once. But war is already a complex activity in which many 
persons are subjected to profound fear, threats, and 
coercion. This is why it has often proven so difficult to 
assign moral culpability for the violence of war. 
Thus violence must include other forms of 
deliberate harm to humans as well. Threats and extortion 
count as violence because a person loses autonomy through 
fear of threat or harm. The violent person violates the 
right of others to determine things for themselves, their 
right, as one author comments, "to be humans rather than 
dogs. 11 5 
The overcoming of another's will, by one's use of 
physical force or intimidiation, is an important element in 
most forms of violence. Clausewitz' classic definition of 
war carries the spirit of this point, although he speaks of 
war's physical activity as violence and speaks of its 
effects in other terms. War, he says, is "an act of 
violence to compel the enemy to fulfill our will; violence 
is the means, imposing our will the end. 11 6 Both in physical 
and psychological attacks on the human person, the common 
element is the contravention of another's will. 
Still more difficult to categorize are social 
structures and patterns of human relationships that 
systematically deny the autonomy and dignity of persons in 
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the community. Slavery is a classic example of an 
institution intimately tied to violence. Moreover, some 
social patterns of prejudice and discrimination involve 
little overt physical violence. Yet, a systematic denial of 
options is one way to deprive autonomy, to violate the 
person's right to decide for herself what to do. So it is 
that morally flawed societies are often described by their 
critics as "violent," even in the absence of significant 
numbers of physical acts of violence. One member of the 
American Friends Service Committee, for example, has 
criticized American society in these words: "The 'good 
order' of society is the routine oppression and racism 
committed against millions of Americans every day. 11 7 
The suggestion is the violence implicit in such 
institutions is perhaps even more dangerous than overt 
physical violence. Jon Sobrino has spoken in similar terms 
of the socio-economic patterns that result in poverty, 
malnutrition, poor health, sickness, and death. He views 
this as the prinicipal evil that needs to be challenged 
first in many societies. 8 In a similar vein Reinhold 
Neihbuhr comments in his article, "Why I left the F. O. R. ": 
"I think it is quite probable that there are wealthy Quakers 
who abhor all violence without recognizing to what degree 
they are beneficiaries of an essentially violent system. 11 9 
A contemporary testimony from a Salvadoran campesino is even 
more pointed: 
You gringos are always worried about violence done 
with machine guns and machetes. But there is 
another kind of violence that you must be aware 
of, too. I used to work on the hacienda. My job 
was to take care of the owner's dogs. I gave them 
meat and bowls of milk, food I couldn't give to my 
own family. When the dogs were sick, I took them 
to the veterinarian in Suchitoto or San Salvador. 
When my children were sick, the owner gave me his 
sympathy, but no medicine as they died. To watch 
your children die of sickness and hunger while you 
can do nothing is a violence to the spirit. We 
have suffered that silently for too many years. 
Why aren't ;ij_ou gringos concerned about that kind 
of violence? 0 
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Now we need to discuss our last three terms: 
force, coercion, and non-violence. First, let us discuss 
force. Force and violence are not the same thing, but there 
seems to be an intimate connection between the two. 
Physical violence involves force, but force is not always 
violent. For example, a person might forcefully restrain an 
intruder, but also might forcefully argue a position. 11 
Moreover, Gandhi spoke of truth-force, and Martin Luther 
King spoke of soul-force. One broader definiton of force, 
then, might be: the effecting of change or the capacity of 
effecting change. In this paper, where physical force and 
violence appear synonomous, the assumption is, unless 
otherwise noted, that physical force is employed in the 
service of violence, that is, it injures or harms another. 
Another term often thought as synonomous with 
force is coercion; so it refers to the modification of a 
situation by overcoming resistance. But coercion usually 
involves making another submit to one's will, i.e. the 
7 
resistance overcome is the other's will; in this case, 
coercion is clearly closer in meaning to violence. Yet, the 
term is ambiguous; it sometimes seems quite different from 
violence. Ronald Miller uses the example of an adult taking 
a child into the water in order to eliminate the child's 
fear of it. In this example, there is coercion, but not 
violence in any proper sense. In blackmail or extortion, 
however, coercion exists that clearly involves violence. 12 
For present purposes, then, coercion will refer to changing 
someone's action of will so that it matches the action 
chosen and desired by the coercer; but since coercion may be 
chosen for the person's genuine good, it is not necessarily 
violent. 
For this reason, the morality of coercion is a 
very complex issue that has left moral and political 
theorists, including pacifists, much divided over the 
centuries. This is particularly true as the inherent 
coerciveness (or not) of the state is debated. Thus 
Reinhold Neibuhr, for example, criticizes the "ethical 
perfectionism" of certain pacifists who condemn all forms of 
coercion. In The Christian Century written prior to World 
War Two, Neibuhr writes: 
... to refuse the use of any coercive methods means 
that it is not recognized that everyone is using 
them all the time, that we all live and benefit or 
suffer from a political and economic order that 
maintains its cohesion partially by the use of 
various forms of coercion.13 
Neibuhr's point is that not all coercion is essentially 
8 
violent. 
Our last term to clarify is non-violence. There 
have been many forms of non-violent action and many 
conceptions of non-violence in different historical 
circumstances. For the purposes of this paper non-violence 
will be taken to mean a person's refusal on moral grounds to 
inflict violence of any form on another person, whether 
physically or by threats or fear or other psychological 
means of harming others, as well as the refusal to 
participate in institutional patterns that are similarly 
harmful. Put positively, non-violence aims to heal 
relations between people, build up community, and remove the 
socio-economic patterns that cause harm to people. This 
initial definiton will be amplified in the body of our 
discussion of non-violence. The following chapter examines 
the thought of two of the greatest proponents of non-
violence, Leo Tolstoy and Mohandas Gandhi. 
Chapter II 
Tolstoy and Gandhi: Two Charismatic Thinkers on Non-Violence 
Perhaps the most famous exponent of non-violence 
in its most complete sense--as a way of life as well as a 
tactic or strategy for social and political change--is the 
"great-souled" one, the little "coolie lawyer," from India, 
Mohandas Karamanchand Gandhi. The belief, conviction, and 
practice of non-violence--in this sense, the refusal to 
return physical or mental injury with injury--had influenced 
for many centuries many individuals and groups who lived 
such beliefs on primarily religious grounds, making religion 
the fundamental moral and factual starting point for many 
practioners of non-violence. Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, 
and Christianity all contained traditions of an ethic of 
love that resisted doing physical and other harm to others, 
even at one's own peril. In the Bhagavad-Gi ta, the Hindu 
song of love and the ancient scripture which Gandhi called 
the "dictionary of daily reference," for example, 
non-violence is held up as a superior ethical virtue. 
I forsee no good will come 
From killing my own kindred in war. 
Even though they slay me, I wish not to strike them. 
How can we be happy, having slain our own kindred 
Though they, with hearts deadened with avarice, 
See not the evil that will come. 14 
There had long been, then, a tradition--or rather 
traditions--of personal non-violence through the course of 
history. The genius of Gandhi was to translate the personal 
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power of non-violent living into a political power aimed at 
social change. He attempted to channel the power of 
personal non-violence in such a way that it would transform 
the inequities in the social ins ti tut ions of his country. 
Yet, Gandhi's path to non-violence, and the contribution he 
made to it in both understanding and practice, were neither 
automatic nor mechanical. As a young man, he wrestled with 
questions of violence. He later said that it was in reading 
Leo Tolstoy's treatise, The Kingdom of God is Within You, 
that he finally became convinced of the rightness of 
non-violence. Of that book, Gandhi writes, "Its reading 
cured me of my scepticism and made me a believer in 
non-violence. What has appealed to me most in Tolstoy's 
life is that he practiced what he preached and reckoned no 
cost too great in his pursuit of truth. 11 15 
This chapter, then, will articulate the moral and 
factual assumptions underlying the charismatic appeal to 
non-violence of the great Russian novelist, Tolstoy, and the 
dedicated Mahatma of India, Gandhi. Furthermore, it will 
attempt to discover and analyze the implicit logic of their 
appeals and evaluate it accordingly. 
Tolstoy 
Tolstoy was a volcanic personality who, upon his 
conversion to Christianity, considered that a faith-based 
morality was the only just expression of a life of love. 
For this reason, he parted with the institutional Orthodox 
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Church, with its ecclesiasticism, dogmas, sacraments, fasts, 
and prayers. Protesting against pietistic mysticism of any 
type, Tolstoy expressed his profound religious faith in 
morality. "Religion," he said, "is a certain relation 
established by man between his separate personality and the 
infinite universe of its Source. And morality is the 
ever-present guide to life which results from that 
relation." The first and foremost moral and factual 
starting point in Tolstoy's message is his profound 
commitment to God and, consequently, to personal morality. 
Having become convinced, at the age of fifty-seven, of the 
truth of the message of Christ and the Sermon on the Mount, 
Tolstoy abandoned the priveleges he enjoyed as a nobleman 
and dedicated himself to a life of simplicity. Adopting 
plain attire and going barefoot, he worked and harvested the 
fields at the side of the peasants.16 
In 1893, he completed The Kingdom of God is within 
You, his major work addressing non-violence and its 
implications. Convinced of a literal intrepretation of the 
Sermon on the Mount, he concluded that all forms of violence 
were completely antithetical to proper Christian living. 
Violence is first taken to mean physical harm, such as 
beating, hanging, punching, kicking, and killing. Later, 
Tolstoy describes and condemns institutionalized violence, 
the meanest expression of which for him was the state 
itself. The state, holds Tolstoy, is morally corrupt 
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because it uses physical violence against people and 
violently coerces its subjects under the "hypnotizing" ruse 
of the "common good." The army and the police are the 
institutional mechanisms for this violent coercion. Tolstoy 
concludes, therefore, that: 
meaning destroys the state," 
Gandhi, as we shall see. 
"Christianity in its true 
a conclusion not shared by 
The Kingdom of God Within You is a call to the 
high ideals of Christian morality, as well as a vehement 
polemic against the institutionalism of church heirarchy, 
who, according to Tolstoy, "for the most part have lost the 
concept of what Christianity is." For Tolstoy, the essence 
of religion lies in the "property of men prophetically to 
foresee and point out the path of life, over which humanity 
must travel, 
from which 
humanity. 11 17 
in a new definition of the meaning of life, 
also results the whole future activity of 
Tolstoy formulated a theory of human development 
which was infused with his moral and religious assumptions. 
He proposed three "conceptions" of life, or three stages in 
humanity's evolution: the animal, the aggregate, and the 
divine. The first stage, the animal, focuses on personal 
gratification; this would be primitive man. The second 
stage involves the organization of humankind into family, 
tribes, groups and states, where personal gratification is 
set aside for the gratification of the will of the 
13 
aggregate. Christianity, not as a mystical teaching, but as 
a new, third concept of life, ushers in the revelation that 
the fulfillment of the will of God offers the deepest 
meaning for humanity.18 "True rational life is possible for 
man only in proportion as he can be a participant, not in 
the family or the state, but in the source of life, the 
Father." The error of institutional Christianity is that it 
has diluted the "vital teaching" of Christ and has made 
unobligatory its demanding moral appeals. 
Tolstoy would condemn the "realism" arguments of 
someone like Reinhold Neibuhr, for example, who would hold 
that a dualistic morality in the modern world is not only 
permissible, but necessary. For individuals can be moral, 
Neibuhr tells us; but nations and states cannot. Instead 
Tolstoy sees only the demands of the "will of the Father"; 
in this he would probably agree with the stinging criticism 
of C. Wright Mills many decades later; 
... the Christian record is rather clear: from the 
time of Constantine to the time of global radi-
ation and the uninterceptible missile, Christians 
have killed Christians and have been blessed for 
doing so by other Christians.19 
Tolstoy, as Gandhi after him, stresses the supreme 
importance of the ideal. However, for Tolstoy when the 
ideal becomes rigorized into a rule or law, it becomes 
uncreative or even destructive. Ideals are by definition 
unattainable; however, man is infinitely capable of changing 
and growing toward the ideal. Yet, lowering the demands of 
14 
the ideal means, in effect, destroying the ideal because the 
power of attraction and perfection is diminished. As 
Tolstoy says, "A moderated perfection loses its power to act 
upon man's soul. n20 For Tolstoy there exist two forces in 
the human person, the animal and the divine. The so-called 
divine force is simply the conciousness of a filial relation 
to God. Living out this filial relationship to God 
constitutes the meaning of true religion. The Sermon on the 
Mount, with its radical message of non-violence and love of 
enemies, constitutes the "signals on the infinite road to 
perfection. 11 21 
The aim of this third new concept of life is to 
"transfer by degrees into the sphere of habit, into the 
sphere of conciousness. 11 22 For Tolstoy, as well as for 
Gandhi, habit, practice and experimentation are necessary to 
deepen and root the ideals. Indeed, Gandhi titled his 
autobiography, The Story of My Experiments in Truth. In 
this sense, Tolstoy and Gandhi may be seen as advocates of 
"orthopraxis," the radical commitment to the ideals of 
Christian or religious morality. Another term which 
expresses the same idea of a radical commitment to the 
person and to society would be Gandhi's term "ahimsa, 11 which 
is broadly translated as "non-violence." 
This type of radical morality has everything to do 
with Tolstoy's view of the human person. The faith-based 
love of the the Christian had firm foundations in the soul 
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and was, according to Tolstoy, totally unrelated to the 
humanitarian morality of the "positivists, socialists, and 
communists." These humanitarians hoped, in Tolstoy's 
estimation, to transfer the love of the family to the love 
of the state and, finally, to the love of humanity. Tolstoy 
agrees that the need for the widening of love is 
incontestable. However, he claims, the humanitarian love of 
the social scientists is some kind of "theoretical deduction 
from analogy." There is no power in it, according to 
Tolstoy. Indeed, "there is a weakening of sentiment in 
proportion as the subject is widened. 1123 In this sense, he 
would agree with Professor Jan Narveson's Nietzchean 
criticism of the "love of humanity" found in some forms of 
pacifism: it is impossible to love "humanity;" we can at 
most love a few.24 Yet Tolstoy goes where neither Narveson 
nor Nietzche go, namely, he holds that only the power of the 
filial relationship with God provides the capacity and 
energy to extend one's ego boundaries. Tolstoy's doctrine 
of love and non-violence, then, rests on the metaphysical 
assumptions of the existence of a personal, omnipotent 
Creator and the individual human soul, the essence of which 
is love. Only faith, for Tolstoy, brings that love to life. 
A radical love which refuses to take up or 
construct arms, or to kill, maim, or torture, and believes 
in the abolition of nation-states, the end of private 
property, and the non-resistance to violent coercion seems 
downright impossible. Nevertheless, 
16 
through habitual 
formation in this God-imbued love, it "will become as 
natural and as simple as the foundations of the family, the 
society, and the political life now appear to us. 11 25 
Tolstoy believed humanity was and is in 
transition. In this respect, he assumed an evolutionary 
view of moral development. He believed that with the advent 
of the Christian concept of life, humanity had outgrown its 
social and political age and entered a new one. Yet, due to 
"inertia," humanity still clings to out-moded former 
patterns of the social concept of life, even though it knows 
the teaching that should be elemental to the new concept of 
life. This lack of correspondence between concept and 
practice produces a series of profound social and moral 
contradictions, which only further signal the need for 
conversion and change. These contradictions are economic, 
political, and international. 
The economic contradictions involve the oppression 
of the working class. In this case, the peasants know 
themselves as beings of worth and dignity, yet find 
themselves enslaved by the rich and ruling classes. Tolstoy 
here describes and analyzes the plight of the working class 
with every bit as much acuity and passion as Marx or Lenin; 
the harms that the poor suffer--poor health, housing, and 
working conditions, and the police apparatus to enforce that 
poverty--are precisely the grounds for a just revolt in 
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marxist-leninist traditions. But, Tolstoy's response to the 
crises is clearly different. Where Lenin argues for 
institutional and material change, necessarily won only by 
violent force, Tolstoy always argues for the supremacy of 
the spiritual, the essential relationship being nonviolence. 
The political contradictions that Tolstoy writes 
of are characterized by the obedience of the masses to laws 
"the rationality of which is doubtful." In this case, 
Tolstoy sees the masses as undermining their dignity as 
rational human beings by obeying unjust laws. These unjust 
laws include war taxes, import duties, church taxes, 
universal military service, and inequitable land distribu-
tion. Obedience to such laws jeopardizes human dignity. 
Gandhi some years later would write in similar terms 
regarding unqualified obedience to the State: "We are sunk 
so low that we fancy it is our duty and religion to do what 
the law lays down. If men only realize it's unmanly to obey 
unjust laws, no man's tyranny will enslave him. 11 26 
The most scandalous contradiction between concept 
and practice is, for Tolstoy, the contradiction in 
international relations. Militarism only provokes 
"universal distrust" and encourages one national power to 
surpass the force of another, thus increasing the danger of 
war. Furthermore, militarism paralyzes the systems on which 
social and the individual welfare depend, increasing the 
evils of the war and the war economy. 
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The removal of these contradictions, says Tolstoy, 
is possible only by a change of life or a change of 
conciousness. Those who cannot or will not change their 
life, says Tolstoy, "drown their conciousness." The 
solution to the problem of war, for Tolstoy, does not lie in 
the hope for governmental arbitration or international 
treaties; it lies only in individual obedience to God. It 
is this obedience on a small, and then grand scale, that 
will eliminate war and, at the same time, abolish 
government. On this point, Tolstoy's views about the state 
and anarchism invite important comparisons with both Gandhi 
and Lenin; therefore, a brief explanation of Tolstoy's 
anarchism follows. 
Tolstoy's idealism refuses to admit a near-just 
society. "Government by its essence has always been a 
justice-impairing force." The reason for this, according to 
Tolstoy, is the standing army and universal military 
service.27 While a standing army does not necessarily need 
to function primarily as a repressive organ, the context of 
the Russian court at the end of the tsarist era bears 
repeating. Tsarism was approaching its nadir. Political 
power was reserved for the Romanovs, and the Romanovs 
assurred their lock on power through the ruthless tactics of 
the secret police. On the basis of his Russian experience, 
Tolstoy concluded that it is an essential property of a 
government to subjugate its citizens. Government never 
voluntarily 
finds its 
estimation, 
renounces its 
expression in 
it is quite 
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power. For Tolstoy, this fact 
the standing army. In his 
erroneous to consider rampant 
militarism, war taxation, and the bursting ranks of the army 
as some kind of accidental phenomenon due to Europe's 
political situation. Instead, such a phenomenon is a 
logical development of the particular conception of life 
that sees the submission and sacrifice of the individual's 
will to the will of the aggregate. The determination of the 
meaning of life is transferred from the individual to the 
group; and so, the interests of individuals are eventually 
sacrificed for the interests of the aggregate. 
Unfortunately, the interests of the aggregate more often 
than not are the interests of a minority who impose their 
will on the masses. But those who resist bear the brunt of 
punishment and bodily violence in any case. 
Tolstoy's criticisms of the state, then, include 
these charges. Power, the means by which the state acts, is 
for Tolstoy, based on bodily violence; state power involved 
using physical force to compel persons to act according to 
the will of the ruling elite. Tolstoy, moreover, saw the 
personal morality of individuals growing more refined over 
the centuries, while the morality of the state degenerated. 
For him, "Governmental power, even if it destroys inner 
violence, invariably introduces new forms of violence into 
the lives of men, and this grows greater and greater in 
20 
proportion with its continuance and intensification. 11 28 
This violence of the state is supported by people's implicit 
or explicit assent to structures and institutions which 
crush or deny the dignity of the person. The phenomenon of 
physical violence used upon those who refuse to submit to 
the unjust institutions occurs to a greater or lesser extent 
in all forms of governments. 
One criticism to be made of Tolstoy's reasoning 
focuses on his universalist assumptions. He often uses 
universalist language in describing the corrupt nature of 
governments. To be sure, his experience in Russia could 
easily lead to a cynical view of all governments, like his 
view that justice and state organization and power are all 
mutually exclusive. While there are indeed important 
tensions between the needs of the individual and the needs 
of the community, on which volumes have been written, it 
does not necessarily follow that this tension in every case 
leads to the moral corruption of either individuals or 
societies. 
Tolstoy asserts his theories as if they were 
inexorable, universal laws; but this critical factual 
assumption needs to be examined. His argument, of course, 
is fairly tight, given his religious assumptions and 
definitions. Tolstoy's criticisms of politics is not 
dissimilar to the famous maxim of Lord Acton, "Power 
corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely." Yet, 
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arguments as Tolstoy's, and statements as Acton's, assume 
universal laws that can be easily disproved by pointing to 
good political rulers and good political institutions. It 
is more correct to suggest that there are strong tendencies 
toward corruption in political life. This, in the end, can 
actually lead us from Tolstoy's despair to fruitful action. 
If we speak of strong tendencies toward corruption in 
political life, then task is to build institutions, such as 
checks and balances, that lessen the likelihood of 
corruption and the use of violence by government. 
For Tolstoy, the standing army and universal 
military service are the formal expressions of the violence 
of goverment, and these expressions introduce a "decomposing 
principle" in the social concept of life. Tolstoy assumes 
that the army exists not merely to defend against invasion, 
but to subjugate citizens. In tsarist and communist Russia, 
this had been amply proven true; yet, again, it need not be 
so in every case. Almost every country in Western Europe 
would serve as an example to disprove this assumption. For 
Tolstoy, the standing army only increases the dangers of 
war, as countries grow in fear and mistrust of one another. 
Now this tendency is certainly present in contemporary 
international relations: India fears Pakistan's 
militarization; Honduras militarizes to match the military 
build-up Nicaragua; Thailand is suspicious of the 
Vietnamese; the U.S. matches step for step or surpasses the 
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Soviet Union in military development; and so on. But 
Tolstoy's assumptions preclude and disparage dialogue as a 
means of defusing tense international difficulties. One 
wonders what is more dangerous, the tension in international 
relations or the abandonment of politics as something 
morally unredeemable. Given the extreme 
contemporary international situation, the 
appears wholly unresponsible. 
urgency of the 
latter option 
Tolstoy argues in almost utilitarian terms against 
the justifiability of war, the inevitable outcome of immoral 
state power: "The menaces of war make all the perfections 
of social life useless and vain. 11 29 Universal military 
service destroys the advantages of the social life; taxes 
swallow the labor which the army is supposed to protect; 
military service takes men away from production. Finally 
the evils of war destroy social and moral cohesion.JO 
How and why does this state of affairs, in which 
states immorally amass power, exist? Tolstoy cites four 
reasons, all of which operate under the assumption that all 
formally religious and political institutions are corrupting 
influences for the individual. The first reason is 
intimidation. The state's ability to use violence against 
individuals intimidates the citizenry into submission. In 
addition, a sense of the sanctity of the state is 
propagated; and those who refuse to accept this are 
punished. A second reason is bribery. A bureaucratic class 
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emerges whose weal th and comfort are dependent on their 
submission to and execution of the will of the government. 
They are, in effect, bribed into supporting it. 
A third reason is "hypnotization." Both religious 
superstitions and the "savage superstition" of patriotism 
are used to dull the consciences and conciousnesses of the 
people. Operating with different assumptions and goals, 
Lenin, later, will use similar terms in his condemnation of 
chauvinistic patriotism and the "bourgeois lulling" of the 
oppressed. Both Lenin and Tolstoy speak contemptuously of 
"moral guides" who assuage the suffering of the oppressed 
with platitudes or political ideology. 
For Tolstoy, there is also a fourth reason for the 
moral slavery of the masses to the state. This is the army 
itself, which uses "intensified methods of stupefaction and 
brutalization" to maintain the state's power. In this case, 
Tolstoy offers a powerful argument against the ethical 
validity of standing army. A dehumanizing process occurs to 
the peasant recruits which paradoxically results in a state 
of affairs where the oppressed oppress themselves.31 
So Tolstoy speaks of the violated citizenry who 
"naively believed that governments existed for their good." 
He advocates society without government, although this is, 
for some, "a blasphemy which ought not even to be 
uttered. 11 32 He concludes that fidelity to conscience and to 
the Father's will requires a kind of faith-based anarchism; 
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that is, a rejection of all political institutions "with 
which is connected the conception of everthing terrible." 
Thus for Tolstoy the problem of government is 
subsumed under the problem of violence. He sees humanity at 
a fork in the road. One way is the way of violence--and 
this leads to moral and physical death; and the other is the 
way of non-violence--and this way leads to life: 
People frequently think that the question of 
nonresistance to evil is an inverted question, a 
question which it is possible to circumvent. It 
is, however, a question which life itself puts 
before all men and before every thinking man, and 
which invariably demands a solution.33 
Violence, for Tolstoy, is the instrument used to 
win advantage for the ruling class. Only mobilized public 
opinion, begun first by those who refuse to march in step 
with the propaganda of government, will change the situation 
and begin to conform practice to the christian concept of 
life. It is these people, says Tolstoy, that governments 
fear more than socialists, communists, and anarchists 
because, finally, their loyalty is to no ideology but to 
God. It was the context of Russia, however, that blinded 
Tolstoy to the real possibility of genuine political service 
motivated by high ideals. The life of Dag Hammarskjoeld and 
his book of Markings, for example, reveal that loyalty to 
God may not lead one away from political involvement to 
preserve a kind of personal purity, but may lead one 
directly into global and national politics as result of 
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one's personal conscientious response to the "will of the 
Father. 1134 
Gandhi 
Gandhi's debt to Tolstoy was formidable, since in 
the Russian count's life and writings were vivid testimony 
to the power and example of radical love and non-violence. 
Yet, Gandhi did not accept wholesale Tolstoy's assumptions 
and conclusions. Indeed, the creative genius of Gandhi was 
to take the very best from different sources of ethical and 
religious inspiration, and in many cases put a fresh 
interpretation on it. In the end, Gandhi did not see 
himself as any founder of a sect, but a man who was simply a 
"humble searcher after Truth, (who) knows his limitations, 
makes mistakes, never hesitates to admit them." This 
section will articulate the principle assumptions and 
presuppostions of Gandhian non-violence. 
The basis of Gandhi's thought is commitment to 
truth; indeed, one of the fundamental terms in Gandhian 
thought is "satyagraha" which means "clinging to truth." 
Truth in this sense suggests being or reality. 35 Indeed, 
the Sanskrit word "satya," means "to be," implying a 
connection between truth and existence. For Gandhi, there 
were clear metaphysical implications in this connection. 
According to Gandhi, what exists, or what lives, is true. 
For Gandhi, God is the ultimate living reality, and it is 
for this reason Gandhi often said "Truth is God." Truth, 
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then, links all life together, it is the unity of life; it 
is reality and so, in a sense, it is life itself. 
Truthfulness, therefore, is any action, disposition, policy 
or thought that affirms life, defends life, nurtures life, 
allows life to flourish, or brings lives together in 
harmony.36 All thoughts, words, and deeds, then, admit the 
possiblity of discovering the life-giving, or truthful 
option; and for Gandhi, finding truth in this broad, 
metaphysical sense meant discovering God. 
Gandhi's non-violence, then, is very much related 
to this broader conception of truth. Truth is that which 
promotes life and respects the fundamental unity of all 
life. Non-violence, or ahimsa, is the attitude, 
disposition, and actions that is the means to truth. "In 
its positive form, ahimsa means the largest love, greatest 
charity. 11 37 Conversely, untruth is anything that inhibits, 
prevents, or impedes life; and this includes all forms of 
physical violence and its psychological and institutional 
embodiments as these harm or injure persons or groups. For 
Gandhi, violence, as a negation of life, was the virtual 
equivalent of untruth. Himsa, the Hindu word for violence, 
included not just the physical acts of violent force and 
injury, but included the very attitude of wanting that 
violence to come about. Ahimsa, similarly, included more 
than the absence of destructive action, but also the 
positive intentions of good-will for others, kindness, 
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generosity, and self-sacrifice. For Gandhi, ahimsa, or non-
violence, was the litmus test of the commitment to truth. 38 
Indeed, for Gandhi, "Non-violence and truth are so 
intertwined that it is practically impossible to disentangle 
and separate them. 11 39 
Influenced greatly by the Hindu sense of dharma, 
that is, the moral obligation to fulfill one's duties, 
Gandhi took non-violence to be a supreme duty in order to 
insure truthful or genuinely life-giving ends. In 1909 he 
wrote, "The means may be likened to a seed, the end to a 
tree," and for this reason he refused any violent short-cuts 
to one's ends. 40 He did not want to risk destroying the 
goals of freedom and justice in India by using means, such 
as violent strategies, that in effect contradict or negate 
the ends. The means, in fact, insofar as they were more 
within the control of the agent than the end, were held to 
have a superior importance for Gandhi. Later, he expressed 
this idea quite simply, "If we take care of the means, we 
are bound to reach the end sooner or later. 11 41 So 
satyagraha, or "clinging to truth," for Gandhi, released 
power and energy that assured "victory" for the satyagrahis, 
though it meant certain suffering as well. 
For Gandhi, the "force of love truly comes into 
play only when it meets the causes of hatred." Suffering in 
the name of justice and truth, and not a masochistic 
self-serving suffering, is at the heart of non-violence. 
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According to Gandhi, suffering for the sake of justice is 
the definitive means by which one will both claim one's own 
dignity and power and provide the necessary moment for the 
conversion of the opponent. In one passage, he writes, 
•.. things of fundamental importance to the people 
are not secured by reason alone but have to be 
purchased with their suffering. Suffering is the 
law of human beings; war is the law of the 
jungle .... The appeal of reason is more to the head 
but the penetration of the heart comes from 
suffering. rt opens up the inner understanding in 
man. Sufferinq is the badge of the human race, 
not the sword.42 
There are several significant observations to be 
made here. First, Gandhi assumes that human suffering is 
creative and is by no means worthless. In this he would 
differ greatly from the revolutionaries considered later in 
this paper who would view nearly all forms of suffering as 
an assault on personal dignity. For Gandhi, however, whose 
aim was never merely a transfer of power, but a 
transformation of relationships, suffering, when it is the 
result of a non-violent struggle for truth and justice, 
provides the creative power to change hearts and minds. 
Suffering awakens the awareness of the fundamental bonds 
between people and lifts from the heart empathy and 
fellow-feeling. 
Furthermore, Gandhi indicates that generosity and 
self-sacrifice, which are the virtues behind suffering, are 
those qualities which truly individuate the human person, 
not aggression or violence. In another passage he writes, 
29 
"Man as animal is violent, but as Spirit is non-violent. 
The moment he awakes to the Spirit within, he cannot remain 
violent. Either he progresses to ahimsa or rushes to his 
doom.1143 This view of the human person is very similar to 
Tolstoy's, who also saw two forces in persons, the animal 
and the divine. He, like Gandhi, believed that the divine 
force was the power which truly made possible full human 
living. 
Finally, Gandhi believed that the efficacy of 
non-violence could be tested only in and through opposition 
and suffering. He argued frequently that non-violence in 
India would be a hollow thing and worth nothing if it 
depended for its success on the goodwill of the authorities. 
In this case, then, the fact that non-violent resisters 
suffer the brutality of their opponents paradoxically 
indicates the possibilities for a successful creative 
encounter between adversaries. Martin Luther King realized 
this years later; 
As my sufferings mounted I soon realized that 
there were two ways that I could respond to my 
situation: either to react with bitterness or 
seek to transform the suffering into a creative 
force. I decided to follow the latter course. 
Recognizing the necessity for suffering, I have 
tried to make of it a virtue.44 
For Gandhi, the willingness to suffer for the sake 
of justice was an indication of the moral superiority of 
non-violence to violence as a way of life and as a strategy 
for social action. Furthermore, Gandhi assumes that ahimsa, 
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or non-violence, is in accord with the deepest truth of 
human nature, and in fact corresponds to the human person's 
innate desire for peace, justice, freedom and dignity. 
Violence, or himsa, degrades and corrupts the human person, 
so to meet violence with violence or hatred with hatred only 
increases one's progressive degeneration. Finally, because 
non-violence is the basic law of our being, it can be used 
as the most effective principle for social action; it heals 
and restores the person's nature, and gives him or her 
means to restore social order and justice.45 
lence 
For Gandhi, 
to violence 
however, the superiority of non-vio-
was determined not 
metaphysical assumptions, but also by 
merely by his 
a prudential 
examination of the utility of violence as a fitting means of 
conflict resolution. Gandhi believed that violence never 
completely overcomes evil, but merely suppresses it for a 
time. Yet, the evil only rises later with a redoubled 
vigor.46 Here, Gandhi would agree with Helder Camara's 
consideration of the "spiral of violence," namely, that 
violence begets violence and never fosters genuine 
reconciliation and healing. Economic oppression, for 
example, is reinforced by violent military or paramilitary 
programs; such oppression and repression lead to 
revolutionary violence, and yet this violence paradoxically 
is used to justify further repression in an escalating 
crisis of societal fragmantation. 47 As Gandhi writes, "A 
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successful bloody revolution can only mean further misery 
for the masses. 11 48 Furthermore, the corrupting tendency of 
violence adds a further argument against its use as a 
fitting tactic for social change: "History teaches one that 
those who have, no doubt with honest motives, ousted the 
greedy by using brute force against them, have in their turn 
become a prey to the disease of the conquered. 11 49 
While such temptations of power obviously do not 
always occur in violent overthrows, Gandhi nevertheless 
believed political history testified to a grave failure in 
the capacity of violence to properly transform social 
relationships. Non-violence, however, according to Gandhi, 
properly transforms relationships and puts a true end to 
evil; for its goal is to convert the opponent and transform 
hostility and fear to friendship and trust. 
Naturally, such a position assumes that even in 
the most wicked persons there is some kind of core goodness 
that can serve as the grounds for a common human encounter. 
For this reason, Gandhi was careful to distinguish between 
the agent of violence and the act of violence. In his 
belief system, "we are all tarred with the same brush," and 
therefore we must look upon our world and all its 
circumstances with great humility. 
Because we are divinely related to all human 
beings, "we must partake of the sin of every person whether 
he belongs to us or to another race. n50 He was therefore 
reluctant to "invoke the beast" in others. 
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While the 
non-violent resister would in every case refuse to cooperate 
with unjust policies, he or she nevertheless would also 
refuse to objectify, humiliate, or brutalize the opponent. 
Recalling again the principle of the unity and sanctity of 
life, Gandhi believed that to harm any human being was to do 
violence to the divine essence relating all people. As 
such, it would represent a fundamental denial of truth. 
Such thoroughgoing non-violence precluded any 
forms of coercion. However, Gandhi later admitted that most 
of the "non-violent" campaigns in India were actually only 
"passive resistance" not thoroughgoing non-violence. They 
did not carry the pure intention of free, loving service, 
and were instead manipulative. Worse, some forms of 
passive resistance is a "non-violence of the weak." That 
is, some of those choosing this tactic do so from cowardice, 
and they would use weapons if they had the access and 
courage to do so. 
policy for the 
In the end, true non-violence is not a 
transforming 
transfer of 
seizure of 
relationships 
power, effected 
power. 
to bring 
freely, 
It is 
about 
without 
a way of 
a peaceful 
coercion or 
compulsion, by all concerned, because all have come to 
recognize it as just and right.51 
According to Gandhi, for non-violence to be 
effective a whole effort, a way of life, is needed. So 
Western pacifists are misguided when they think that war can 
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be stopped by mere propaganda; the causes of war first lie 
in the hearts of men and women.52 The ending of war begins 
first with individual conversion and a commitment to loving 
service. Thus, when all people begin to act on the truth 
that we are all divinely related as brothers and sisters, 
then and only then wars will cease to occur. 
For Gandhi, the aim to end wars is not "a matter 
of preaching, but of building, brick by brick, a new non-
violent social order." Satyagraha, then, is not merely a 
radical confrontation to violent institutions, but an 
active, service-oriented disposition as well. This is the 
basis of Gandhi's so-called "Constructive Progam," an 
attempt to mobilize volunteers to teach, work, and serve 
others so that the well-being of all Indians might be 
improved.53 Through all of Gandhi's inspirations run the 
influences of the Gita ideal of "karmayogin," the perfect 
man, as well as the examples of Jesus, Thoreau, and Tolstoy. 
Morality is of supreme importance to Gandhi, as it had been 
for Tolstoy; yet, for Gandhi, as for Tolstoy, morality was a 
faith-based, thoroughgoing non-violence of heart, mind, 
soul, and body. 
Gandhi's appeal to non-violence rests 
fundamentally on his 
assumptions. In viewing 
benevolent Creator, he 
philosophical and religious 
the universe as sustained by a 
subsequently held firm to an 
extremely optimistic interpretation of the human person. He 
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believed in the basic goodness of the human person and in 
the process of searching for Truth, which he identified as 
that which gives life. Indeed, he held a kind of "moral 
epistemology" in which he believed definite, observable, 
"truth" could be discovered in the search for that which 
gives life. Those who consider these assumptions inadequate 
or, worse, false, might judge his appeal to non-violence, 
not as the call to a superior tactic for social change, but 
as extremely naive and therefore dangerous. In the face of 
certain brutal oppressors, the objector would claim, the 
call to thoroughgoing non-violence presumes a capacity for 
sacrifice that is in all likelihood beyond most persons. 
Gandhi would respond to this objection by humbly claiming 
that every one of his accomplishments was more than 
attainable by the average person. Moreover, a look at the 
verifiable effects of non-violence--inner peace for the 
individual, the construction of the good society, the 
willingness to sacrifice in the face of unjust laws or 
circumstances in order to effect positive change--argues as 
deeds and examples perhaps better than any words do for non-
violence as effective strategy for social change. 
Still other objectors might argue that non-
violence is only genuinely effective in nations where there 
are political structures and institutions that are already 
fundamentally open to social change. Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu has adressed this issue in comparing black activist 
movements in the United States and South Africa. 
3S 
In the 
United States, activists in the civil rights movement of the 
1960s needed to claim their legal rights already gauranteed 
them in the Constitution. In South Africa, blacks not only 
must contend with racist attitudes and policies, but also 
with the severe political limitations constraining them 
which are actually written into the South African 
Constitution, the law of the land in that country. Tutu 
fears that such a fundamental lack of political openness in 
South Africa will doom the non-violent movement in that 
country and eventually lead to great bloodshed.S4 
Similarly, the question of the appropriateness of 
non-violence is raised in the face of brutal dictators like 
Hitler and Stalin. While there are limited accounts of non-
violent resistance in World War Two, usually taking the form 
of heroic individuals and communities risking their lives to 
protect Jews, certain strategists of non-violent action have 
agreed with the critics that for non-violence to approach 
any measure of political effectiveness, at the minimun an 
extensive network of organization and training needs to be 
in place; otherwise, the dictator need only to imprison, 
exile, or assasinate the charismatic leader and thus subvert 
the momentum of the movement.SS 
With the absence of such a network, and sometimes 
even with it, we can imagine regimes so brutal that non-
violence can no longer be considered as an efficient 
strategy for social change. 
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Some advocates for non-violent 
action, however, would contend that non-violence 
accomplishes superior gains for humanity even in the most 
desperate and doomed situations. The argument here involves 
giving great weight to spiritual values of witness, 
redemptive or sacrificial love, and faith; while 
demonstration of this point involves analysis that is beyond 
the scope of this paper, certainly the two thinkers examined 
in this section would argue for non-violence even in the 
most desperate circumstances by appealing to these spiritual 
values. 
In concluding this chapter, I will identify the 
principal points of comparison between Tolstoy and Gandhi, 
especially in their sets of shared assumptions. First and 
foremost is the metaphysical assumption that men and women 
are related to a personal, powerful, and caring God. The 
belief in a benevolent God naturally led both men to 
construct a value system which placed a high priority on 
service and justice. Gandhi and Tolstoy believed that 
fundamentally all men and women were brothers and sisters. 
Both, then, placed an absolute value in the primacy of a 
faith-based morality; at the same time, however, they valued 
a detachment from results in favor of relationships. Both 
Tolstoy and Gandhi would hold an ethic of ultimate ends: 
"Do rightly and leave the rest to God." Each individual was 
obliged to live rightly and to respond vigorously to the 
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call of conscience. It is for this reason that Tolstoy was 
convinced that persons faithful to their conscience were 
more of a threat to governments than communists or 
anarchists. For Gandhi, the importance of one's 
obligations, best expressed in the stories found in the 
Bhagavad-Gita, meant practically for him that faithful, non-
violent attention to the means for social change would 
assure that the goals for change would not be subverted. 
Another similarity shared by the two great 
exponents of nonviolence is their distrust of and skepticism 
toward modern social institutions. Tolstoy saw humanity as 
breaking forth from the social concept of life into the 
divine concept of life, but saw institutions growing more 
implicated with violence. This led to a kind of christian 
anarchism. Gandhi was also critical of the attractions of 
luxury, greed, and materialism that surface in the 
lifestyles of adherents to certain political and social 
ideologies. He called these tendencies a "positive menace 
to the moral growth of man." In his estimation, greed and 
materialism have the effect of dulling both the reason and 
conscience of the individual; reason is "employed at 
deception" and "worships at the altar of wealth and 
happiness," and conscience either "connives" with such 
dulled reason or is extinguished. For Gandhi, there existed 
an inverse relationship between material progress and moral 
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progress. In fact, for him material affluence and moral 
turpitude were intimately connected.56 
In Gandhi, however, there is always, as with 
Tolstoy, the belief in the divine possibility of the human. 
For Tolstoy, the Son of God sought to be liberated from the 
heart of the individual, and, for Gandhi, man may not "be 
God, but neither is he different from the spark of God." 
The indictment, in both figures, is against structures and 
institutions created by men and women; for these contain the 
nearly inevitable possibility of enslaving pecple instead of 
freeing them. Tolstoy saw the state as the ultimate 
violater of human dignity and freedom, and saw anarchism, 
rooted in conscience and non-violence, as the only way a 
person of dignity and faith could respond. Gandhi, however, 
rejected anarchism, though he clearly saw the corrupting 
tendencies of the state and politics. Still, he thought 
anarchists were "the enemy of the people," and considered 
non-violent activists as the true benefactors and 
philantropists of the state, for they had in their best 
interest the welfare of the state, which was and is, in the 
end, the welfare of men and women. 57 So while Gandhi and 
Tolstoy both shared a skeptical view of the nature of social 
and political institutions, only Gandhi genuinely 
appreciated the redeeming and socially beneficial potential 
of these institutions. 
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This view of Gandhi's reflected a view of power 
quite different from Tolstoy's. Tolstoy assumed power to be 
in every case antithetical to christian living. He assumed 
the basis of power to be physical violence in every case. 
But it is probably more correct to say that violence can be 
used in the service of power. Such power is used by some to 
control, extort, coerce, or compel the will of others. Such 
is one form of power; but it is not exhaustive of the 
possibilities. Tolstoy seems to overlook that one can speak 
of the "power of truth" or the "power of love," the basis of 
which is, indeed, a kind of force, but one that does not 
crush, destroy, or violate persons. Such such a power does 
indeed intend at times to provoke moments of crisis in order 
to gain new breakthroughs or new understandings; but it need 
not always violate people's dignity. 
For Gandhi, however, the basis of power for good 
is not a passive subject, but an engaged citizenry. The 
state does have a distinct power of direction; but its 
effectiveness depends on its ability to elicit other forms 
of power to support its own. Power, for Gandhi, was a 
by-product of social activity and human relationships. He 
considered, unlike Tolstoy, the possibility of the 
purification of politics, and he believed that a state is 
only as directive and powerful as the citizens permit.58 In 
this sense, people of conscience are indeed the true 
benefactors of the state since they challenge corrupt 
40 
policies of the government and are willing to risk reputa-
tion and even life to do so. The March, 1986, peaceful 
revolution in the Philippines, with the proud exaltation of 
"people power" serves as an illustration of the possibilites 
of social change when there is an "engaged citizenry." 
Finally, both figures were convinced of the 
evolutionary possibilities of the human person, and saw 
non-violence as gradually developing within the species. In 
a passage very similar to Tolstoy's discussion of the three 
concepts of life, Gandhi writes; 
Thus from being a nomad he settled down to 
civilized stable life, founded villages and towns, 
and from a member of a family he became member of 
a community and a nation. All these are signs of 
progressive ahimsa and diminishing himsa. Had it 
been otherwise, the human species should have been 
extinct by now, even as many of the lower species 
have disappeared.59 
This passage reflects an optimism and the growth 
possibilities of the human person and community. While 
himsa does pervade the world, ahimsa grows within 
individuals and communities. New habits, "experiments in 
truth," help non-violence to grow in the minds and hearts of 
people. New ways of being and relating are discovered, and 
one of them is the realization that violence is not a 
mechanistic necessity in conflict situations, a conclusion 
not shared by many revolutionaries. For Gandhi and Tolstoy, 
however, non-violence always offered the right and best 
response to evil or injustice because of its basis in faith, 
truth, and the unity of life. For points of comparison, we 
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are now ready to turn to two revolutionaries, many of whose 
assumptions and principles could not be more different than 
those of Tolstoy and Gandhi. 
Chapter III 
Two Charismatic Thinkers on Revolutionary Violence: 
Lenin and Fanon 
Lenin 
... a long period of birth pangs lies between 
capitalism and socialism; violence is always the 
midwife of the old society; that a special state 
(i.e., a special system of organized coercion of a 
special class) corresponds to the transitional 
period between bourgeois society and socialist 
society, namely, the Dictatorship of the 
Proletariat.GO 
.•. as long as no violence is used against the 
people, there is no other road to power .... 61 
There is no question that Vladimir Ilyich Lenin 
ranks as one of the top three or four most influential 
historical figures of the twentieth century. His 
adaptations of Marxism and his enormous organizational 
powers were instrumentally directed to one question: what 
could be done to bring about the socialist revolution in 
Russia?62 His answer, which included both an instrumental 
view of and a charismatic appeal to the use of violence, was 
based on certain moral and factual assumptions which will be 
explored in this section. Further, I will determine the 
implicit logic of his appeal to physical violence and 
evaluate it accordingly. 
The first and foremost starting point in Lenin's 
call to revolutionary violence is Marxism. Marx and Engels 
had provided a thoroughgoing analysis of capitalism and had 
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explained the misery of working class Europe in the mid-
nineteenth century as being a direct result of the conflict 
generated between those persons who owned the means of 
production, capitalists, and those persons who were forced 
to sell their labor power in order to survive, industrial 
workers. Marx and Engels had predicted that the plight of 
the workers in Europe would worsen, that a greater 
polarization between capitalists and workers would occur, 
and that these antagonisms would lead eventually to the 
demise of capitalism and to the birth of socialism. The 
degradation of human beings to the level of animals would be 
the catalyst which would ignite the workers to spontaneously 
rise up and cast off the burden imposed on them from the 
capitalist system. In his earlier writings, Marx assumed 
that spontaneous rejection of exploitation and the advent of 
the socialist era necessarily meant a violent revolution. 
The familiar cry in the Communist Manifesto bears recalling; 
The Communists disdain to conceal their views and 
aims. They openly declare that their ends can be 
attained only by the forcible overthrow of all 
existing social conditions. Let the ruling 
classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The 
proletarians have nothing to lose but their 
chains. They have a world to win.63 
It is clear in this passage, and many others, that 
Marx was convinced that physical violence was necessary for 
the transition to socialism. The principal justification 
for this resort to violence seems to be economic oppression 
conjoined with overt repression. Workers are first degraded 
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to the level of animals by the exploitation of the 
capitalists. The hunger, disease, and early deaths due to 
poor working conditions constitute violations of their 
dignity suffered on the part of the workers. A second level 
of violation is directed against the worker in the form of 
overt, physical repression as workers begin to organize for 
their rights. The economic oppression and the polarization 
created by the physical repression was the basis of Marx's 
early predictions of a violent revolution as the 
precondition for a successful transition to socialism. 
However, in his later years Marx was both less 
strident and more ambiguous in his language on revolution. 
Without renouncing his basic belief that the socialist 
revolution would be in most countries have to take place by 
physical force, Marx also envisaged the possibility of a 
non-violent path to socialism in certain countries. 64 In 
1872, for example, Marx delivered a speech in which he 
claimed that in countries such as America and England, 
"workers can attain their goal by peaceful means. 11 65 At the 
same time, he was quick to qualify that in most countries, 
"the lever of our revolution must be force." Within the 
context of his speech, Marx intended "force" to mean the use 
of physical violence. 
The assumption that violent revolution is needed 
in most countries appears to be determined by the lack of 
genuinely free and democratic structures in those countries. 
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Here lies the core of the debate on violence in Marxist 
theory. If the Marxist call to violence is based on the 
fact of repression in certain countries, then the absence of 
repression and, conversely, the presence of democratic 
political structures, renders void the call to violence. 
Indeed, toward the end of the nineteenth century, as 
repression against workers diminished, and material 
advantages were being accrued to the workers precisely 
through the political process, certain Marxists began to 
speak of socialism won by evolution, not violent revolution. 
While Marx did warn against mere reformism and castigate 
liberals in his famous "Circular Letter," he nonetheless did 
foresee the possibility of a peaceful transfer to socialism. 
After Marx's death, Engels seemed to soften the Circular 
Letter's insistence on revolutionary class struggle as the 
only acceptable political strategy for a socialist party. 
Elsewhere, he argues that modern technology had renedered 
obsolete classic street fighting and declared the decisive 
"shock force" of the international proletarian party to be 
the two million voters it sends to the ballot boxes. Still, 
his concluding words in Tactics in a Social Democracy 
reinforce his commitment to the Marxian idea of 
revolutionary class struggle.66 
In sum, there is an ambiguous legacy in Marx and 
Engels' call to violent revolution. While there are 
certainly appeals to the use of violence in the writings of 
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Marx and Engels, there are certain nuances as well that 
raise the critical question: does revolution in Marxist 
terms necessarily imply violent revolution? The debate has 
raged for decades. For Lenin, however, there was no debate, 
nor ambiguity. In State and Revolution and other works, 
Lenin sought to re-capture the "revolutionary soul" of 
Marxism and to establish within Marxist thought the full 
legitimacy of taking power by force and violence.67 Lenin 
considered violent revolution to be the essential component 
of Marxist thought, and, accordingly, brooked no compromise 
with putative Marxists urging a gradualist approach to 
socialist transformation.68 
Lenin's criticisms were levied against social 
democrats as Eduoard Bernstein, who sought to explain the 
failure of Marx's predictions of violent revolution in 
Western Europe near the end of the nineteenth century. 
Conditions for workers in Western Europe were improving, not 
worsening. They were not getting poorer, repression against 
them was relaxing, and the bourgeoisie was not contracting, 
but expanding. Furthermore, the state, which in Marx' view 
was the principal vehicle for class domination, began 
finally to recognize the claims of the proletariat: workers 
began to enter European Parliaments, and social welfare 
programs, insurance programs, and restrictions on working 
conditions began to be legalized.69 If economic oppression 
conjoined with violent repression was the implicit principal 
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justification in Marx for the use of violence to redress 
these net ills, the factual developments in Western Europe 
by the end of the nineteenth century seemed to render 
invalid the original conclusion and call in Marx for 
revolutionary violence. 
did the social and 
In one place in Europe, however, 
political development of workers 
completely fail to improve, and that was in Tsarist Russia. 
The Russian context, as we will see, is crucial. 
Lenin, influenced both by the long tradition of 
Russian revolutionary activity and by Marxism, condemned 
Berstein's evolutionary socialism as an outright distortion 
of Marx. In the vicious and repressive milieu of Tsarist 
Russia, Lenin, in What Is To Be Done?, set aside problems in 
Marxism raised by the failure of Marx's predictions and 
instead focussed on other ambiguities in Marx, for example 
the revolutionary conciousness of the proletariat. Lenin 
chose an activist interpretation of Marx, first by rejecting 
the claims of some who thought the proletariat was capable 
of coming to revolutionary conciousness without the 
education and training of social democrats well versed in 
Marxism. The most an "uneducated" proletariat could hope 
for, Lenin argued, is what he called "trade-union 
an end to conciousness"; they would not aspire to 
capitalism, only to mere reforms within it. 
out that the socialist and labor party 
independently of each other. Therefore, it 
Lenin pointed 
had grown up 
was proper to 
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conclude that a "true" social democratic conciousness, which 
recognized the irreconciliability of classes within 
capitalism and the consequent necessity of revolution, had 
to be imparted from without.70 In a major revision of Marx, 
Lenin argued that a vanguard party was necessary in order to 
lead the revolution on behalf of the proletariat. 
Again, the Russian context is perhaps the single 
most important factual starting point in Lenin's categorical 
rejection of peaceful, gradual transition to socialism. The 
exploitation of Russian workers in the late nineteenth 
century was perhaps only matched by the suffering of Western 
European workers forty years earlier. Furthermore, few 
strong democratic political structures were in place in 
Russia, owing both to the repressive tactics of the Tsar's 
secret police and to the lack of, in comparison to other 
Western European countries, an extensive literate and urban 
citizenry; Russia's social strata was still largely 
dominated by the rural and uneducated peasantry. These 
factors, concluded Lenin, necessitated the creation of a 
vanguard party to effectively lead the revolution. 
The original Marxist justification for 
revolutionary violence--economic oppression conjoined with 
repressive violence in a political context in which were 
present no democratic structures--appeared applicable to the 
Russian case as nowhere else. For Lenin, the revolution was 
paramount, and the revolution depended on the workers 
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gaining social democratic conciousness. Given the relative 
backwardness of Russia and the interest of the monarchy in 
preventing revolution through its secret police, only one 
course of action, according to Lenin, was open to the true 
marxist: the formation of a vanguard party of professional 
revolutionaries, able to work through and outside of labor 
unions, and who were skilled enough in conspiratorial 
tactics to overcome the subversion of the police. As such, 
this too constituted a major revison of Marx, who, in later 
years came to accept the idea of a party, but always viewed 
it as being internally democratic. 
Lenin argued that by stupidly or naively adhering 
to democratic forms, socialists invited ruin. For him the 
revolution was paramount, and therefore, in the context of 
Russia, any political amateurishness on the part of 
socialists was intolerable. For genuine social democratic 
conciousness to emerge among workers, a secret elite needed 
shrewedly to match and surpass the conspiratorial tactics of 
the police. Lenin's argument for a conpiratorial elite is 
based precisely on the same assumptions that are used in 
arguments which conclude that non-violence would never work 
in countries with no tradition of respect for democratic 
expression. 
of an open 
Secret police would kill or capture the leaders 
movement and thereby render destroy the 
effectiveness of its, in this case, non-violent strategies. 
Effectiveness is not always the deepest concern 
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for certain advocates of non-violence, including Gandhi and 
Tolstoy. It is an axiom in their thought that the goal or 
objective cannot be evaluated apart from the means. In the 
means are contained the ultimate end. Therefore, if peace, 
respect, fairness, community, and non-violence are ultimate 
ends, then these must be practiced in the means as well as 
the more mediate objectives. Fidelity to the ultimate ends 
in our choice of means suggests that, despite the odds, the 
ends will eventually take care of themselves. 
Such a methodology, however, would strike Lenin as 
absurd. Yet, one cannot underestimate the effect of Lenin's 
cultural conditioning upon him. First, the use of violence 
had a long history in Russian revolutionary tradition. 
Moreover, Lenin, convinced as he was of the truly liberating 
possibilities of socialism, was confronted by the violence 
of reactionary Russia. For him, the choice was clear: 
revolutionary violence was a necessary element in the 
transformation of Russia to socialism. Lenin also tended to 
reduce the world to a titanic struggle between oppressors 
and oppressed, namely, the capitalists and the proletarians 
and peasantry. The forces of good, with the vanguard 
leading the proletarians and peasantry, inevitably must 
clash with the forces of evil, tsarist autocracy allied with 
the larger capitalist interests in Russia and the world.71 
He assumed, probably correctly given his context, that his 
opponents would use any means at hand to crush socialism's 
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development. Therefore, he would use any means to advance 
it. "An oppressed class which does not strive to use arms 
and to acquire arms deserves to be treated like slaves. 11 72 
Lenin ridiculed socialists who refused to take up 
arms. He called them the "spineless hangers-on" of the 
bourgeoisie who are prepared to "wade into the water 
provided they don't get wet. 117 3 Implied in this statement 
is the identification of courage with the use of violence 
and implicitly, the taking of life. Gandhi, however, 
identified the boldest form of courage as the refusal to 
take another's life, even at the cost of great personal 
suffering. Elsewhere, Lenin mocks christian socialists who 
recoil in horror at the use of arms to redress society's 
ills. "Capitalist society," he argues, "is and always has 
been the horror without end." He criticizes "social 
parsons" who envision a dream of a peaceful socialism. 
These persons, according to Lenin, refuse to reflect on the 
"fierce class struggle" and the class war necessary to 
achieve that vision. The words he chooses here are not 
metaphors but are intended to mean physical, violent 
confrontation. 
In arguing that the "Dictatorship of the 
Proletariat" is an essential component of "true Marxism" in 
his political text, State and Revolution, Lenin criticizes 
"sham socialists" (obviously the later Marx notwithstanding) 
who imagine a peaceful transfer to socialism. To redress 
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the institutional and repressive violence of the 
bourgeoisie, the proletariat needs state power, II a 
centralized organization of force, an organization of 
violence," in order to crush the resistance of the 
exploiters and to lead the oppressed in the work of 
organizing a socialist economy.74 Addressing the issue of 
disarmament in a speech written in 1916, Lenin asserts as 
essential elements of Marxist theory both violent revolution 
and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, and explains that 
this phrase is to be understood in terms of this theory: 
But whoever expects that socialism will be 
achieved without a social revolution and the 
dictatorship of the proletariat is not a 
socialist. Dictatorship is state power based 
directly on violence. And in the twentieth 
century--as in the age of civilisation generally--
violence means neither a fist nor a club, but 
troops. To put "disarmament" in the programme is 
tantamount to making the general declaration: We 
are opposed to the use of arms. There is as 
little Marxism in this as there would be if we 
were to say: We are opposed to violence!75 
For Lenin, violent war is an inevitable result of 
the assumed irreconciliability between capitalists and 
workers. In his view, this conflict presupposed war. "He 
who accepts class struggle cannot fail to accept civil 
wars. 11 76 The implied inevitability of violence, which 
serves as a justification for violence as well, is primarily 
based on a dialectical interpretation of history and the 
concept of class struggle. Both of these concepts need to 
be analyzed. 
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When Lenin speaks of violence as always the 
midwife of the old society, and rebukes those who fail to 
see the historical prospects of the battle between socialism 
and capitalism, he assumes an apparent dialectical 
inevitability of violent revolution. Dialectical "laws", 
however, tend to inject a priori assumptions into the 
analysis of social change: they report that history 
develops through a process of negation and qualitative leaps 
from one stage to another, and that violence is the 
necessary negation for the transition from one economic 
stage to another. 77 But, as Arthur McGovern has pointed 
out, what violent revolutions can be posited which marked 
the transition from ancient to feudal society? Further, 
many societies, particularly in Western Europe (with certain 
exceptions such as the English and French Revolutions), have 
changed from one level of economic development (in terms of 
class relationships and productive forces) to another 
without civil or international wars. McGovern concludes 
that to establish the necessity of violent revolution one 
must look to other grounds other than dialectical 
inevitability.78 
Another assumption that Lenin makes is in his 
equation of class struggle and civil war. On the one hand, 
class struggle can be viewed as a social reality and the 
object of Marxist analysis. Yet, a recurring criticism of 
radical Marxist analysis, one that Lenin is subject to as 
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well, is the tendency to reduce a complex set of class 
divisions to two antagonists: capitalists and workers. 
Similarly, in this account of things a complex set of causes 
for social conflict are reduced to one cause: class 
struggle. Actual social change is much more complex in its 
causality. 79 
On the other hand, class struggle can be viewed 
not just as an objective reality, 
social change as well. The logic 
but as a program 
runs like this: 
for 
the 
capitalist system creates conflicts, therefore, to eliminate 
conflicts, change the system. This implies the activist 
interpretation of Marx, adduced to earlier. Provocation, 
education, agitation, and eventually the use of violence, in 
the name of class struggle, follows under this activist 
interpretation. While Lenin could not speak for all 
marxist-leninists, this activist interpretation can fall to 
the tempatation to absolutize the cause; in such cases there 
is present as well the temptation to justify any means in 
order to attain the end. Even Lenin himself said, "Morality 
is subordinated to the interests of the proletariat's class 
struggle. 11 80 The creation of a new society won and perhaps 
enforced by blood and terror severely damages the bonds of 
trust, confidence, and joy which are so important to healthy 
community life; this suggests that few societal goals, if 
any, are worth resorting to any means, particularly terror, 
bloodshed, and tyranny, in order to achieve them. 
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In the name of class struggle and the movement to 
socialism, Lenin categorically identified as just both 
colonial wars of liberation and civil wars in industrialized 
countries. Conversely, he declared unjust any imperialistic 
wars, such as World War One, because such wars were driven 
fundamentally by the drive for accumulation and 
aggrandizement. Arguing that the relatively well-off 
workers in Western Europe had betrayed fundamental socialist 
truths and had been "bribed" by the super-profits generated 
by colonialism, Lenin stood alone in taking this radical 
stance vis-a-vis World War One. Rejecting patriotism, 
social chauvinism, and pacifism, he called on each socialist 
to work for the defeat of his own country, and urged that 
the international war be turned into civil wars in all 
European countries.Bl Civil war based on the socialist 
drive for liberation was, for Lenin, "the only war that is 
legitimate, just, and sacred. 11 82 
Lenin's appeal to violence, then, is based on the 
traditional Marxist vision of a new society where full human 
potential is realized. A heroic battle to create the new 
society forms the "sacred war of the oppressed to overthrow 
the oppressors and to liberate the working people from all 
opression. n83 civil wars, then, are considered by Lenin to 
be fully legitimate, progressive, and necessary, when they 
represent the struggle of the working class to overcome the 
oppressor class and usher in a new society. However, as 
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argued earlier, certain other historical changes do not 
suggest the dialectical inevitabilty of violence and, 
furthermore, the raw equation of capitalism with oppression 
and socialism with complete human liberation tends to reduce 
complex social and economic causes of conflict to two 
abstract protagonists and, consequently, underestimates 
human tendencies to power, greed, and corruption, but also 
cooperation and mutual recognition of needs. 
In fairness to Lenin, we must add that his 
conviction in the liberating potential of socialism was so 
strong that he believed that all wars would soon be 
abolished with the advent of socialism. Yet, that remains a 
tenuous hope, especially when any means necessary to achieve 
that vision is acceptable. This is especially so because 
Lenin insisted as essential to Marxist socialism the 
formation of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, a 
centralized organization of the ruling proletariat using 
whatever violence necessary to crush the bourgeoisie and 
other reactionary forces. Lenin argued that essential to 
Marxism is this repressive organization of the Proletariat, 
although Marx himself rarely spoke of a repressive role for 
the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, and when he did he 
insisted that these tactics were to be conjoined with 
peaceful tactics. Furthermore, Marx stressed that the 
Dictatorship was to be a rule of the workers as a whole, and 
not by an elite vanguard.84 
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The willingness to use repression to win full 
human freedom appears to be a serious contradiction between 
the means and the ends of human community. The use of 
violence introduces considerable material and psychological 
costs in a country. Guilt, fear, depression, remorse, 
hatred, anger, destruction, and poverty are all obvious 
psychological and material defects that are often the result 
of the use of physical violence. Many lives are lost, and 
the people who survive the violent upheaval are often 
materially and psychologically in a worse position both as 
individuals and as communities than prior to the violent 
revolution. While this tendency might not be inevitable, 
its repeated occurrence in history should generate serious 
hesitations for advocates of violent revolution who 
genuinely value personal and social human growth. While 
Lenin aims for the liberation of the exploited, he offers no 
thoughtful assessment of the damage that the use of violence 
might do to individuals and societies. 
Furthermore, the tendency to absolutize or to 
exalt "the vision," whether capitalist or socialist, tends 
to blur the distinction between ends and means. Absolute 
conviction in socialism's liberating power may tend to cause 
some to overlook or even to advocate certain repressive and 
violent actions which otherwise might naturally appear to be 
offensive and destructive to human community. If socialism 
modestly proposes a solution not to all human ills, but only 
those based on the economic, social, 
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and political 
conditions, then it would appear to be in the socialist's 
favor to guard faithfully against violent excesses. The 
excesses in Stalinist Russia, Communist China, and in 
Cambodia, for example, naturally lead to the suggestion that 
absolutized socialism, far from promoting genuine human 
realization, is completely antithetical to it. As Sidney 
Hook once said, "Under communism, man ceases to suffer as 
an animal and suffers as a human. He therefore moves from 
the plane of the pitiful to the plane of the tragic. 11 85 
While the tendency to absolutize socialism, which 
includes the tendency to obscure the critical importance of 
the means of social change, need not be present universally 
among socialists, the tendency is certainly present in 
Lenin. Coming from his particular background in repressive, 
reactionary Russia, he saw in Marxism an answer to the 
social and economic ills of his country. Influenced as well 
by Russian revolutionary tradition, he concluded and 
appealed to revolutionary violence, justifying it on grounds 
of class struggle and dialectical inevitability. In his 
appeal to violence, however, was the tendency to absolutize 
socialism, thus permitting in his followers violent excesses 
which contradict the very goals that he intended. 
Fanon 
Frantz Fanon was a humanist who eventually 
espoused revolutionary violence in order to 
relieve the oppression of the colonial system.B6 
(Fanon is) 
violence, a 
lyricism.B7 
the most eloquent panegyrst of 
writer who celebrates it with savage 
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The name of Frantz Fanon has for over two decades 
charged political debates with emotion and fury, inviting 
both staunch celebration from his admirers and strident 
condemnation from his opponets. The publication in 1961 of 
the radicalized French psychiatrist's book, The Wretched of 
the Earth, became a clarion call for revolutionary violence 
in black African independence movements. A famous preface 
by Jean-Paul Sartre "dared" Europeans to have the courage to 
read Fanon's book, while Sartre himself uncritically 
interpreted Fanon as an indiscriminate zealot for the use of 
revolutionary violence. While in the last analysis Fanon 
does issue a call to revolutionary violence in no uncertain 
terms, some scholars have argued that, putting aside Fanon's 
rhetoric, his panegryic on violence is nothing more than an 
adaptation of the principle of self-defense.BB 
Understanding that oversimplifying Fanon can occur in both 
his admirers and opponents, I will aim in this section to 
uncover the moral and factual assumptions and the logic 
implied in Fanon's charismatic appeal to violence, and then 
evaluate it accordingly. 
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A major, and I think valid, criticism of Fanon is 
his careless use of terminology. 89 Often he fails to 
define such crucial terms as violence and liberation, and he 
further obfuscates what meaning can be implied in the text 
by using one term when another might be more appropriate. 
For example, Fanon often speaks interchangeably of violence, 
force, and coercion. Any attempt, then, to understand The 
Wretched of the Earth needs to decipher the possible 
meanings of his principle term, violence. 
His call to revolutionary violence is a call to 
use physical force--arms, bombs, guns, and the like--to 
overthrow the established order. This view of violence is 
decidedly instrumental, and the locus of this 
instrumentality is the colonial situation. It is his 
analysis of the colonial situation, however, which soon 
renders his use of the term ambiguous. "Colonialism is 
violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when 
confronted with greater violence. n90 By this he implies 
that in the very fabric of colonialism are social, cultural, 
and physical patterns of relationships that are injurious to 
the native. This seemingly all-pervasive detriment is 
"violence in its natural state," a concept not further 
explained. From Fanon's rambling discussion we can discern, 
besides physical acts of violence, violence embedded in 
institutions and in psychological relationships. The only 
means to remove such patterns of injury to the native is the 
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resort to physical violence, e.g., a war of independence. A 
further explanation of this analysis of colonialism is 
needed. 
first 
For 
with 
Fanon, the violence of colonialism begins 
the overt physical violence used both to 
establish and to maintain imperial authority over indigenous 
people. "It is obvious here that the agents of government 
speak the language of pure force. n91 In the colonies, 
rational persuasion is replaced by "rifle butts and napalm." 
The overt presence and utilization of military force to 
maintain rule makes a mockery, according to Fanon, of so-
called Western values. The military presence, especially in 
its use of torture and other repressive tactics, is the 
first and foremost component of what Fanon calls "the 
atmosphere of violence" in the colonies. 
A second aspect of colonial oppression discussed 
by Fanon is the outright economic exploitation of the 
native. Here institutional violations of the dignity of 
human individuals and communities result directly from the 
inequitable distribution of material and social resources. 
Good housing, medical care, sanitation, food supplies, fair 
wages, education and other goods and services are first 
reserved for the rich, in this case, the white European 
settler. The native person's consequent suffering due to a 
deprivation of these basic goods and services is a direct 
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result, according to Fanon, of the colonialist/capitalist 
system. 
In this analysis of economic exploitation, Fanon 
makes use of certain marxist categories and adapts others to 
his needs, anticipating later more controversial theories of 
unequal development. These theories regularly explain the 
poverty and misery of lesser developed countries, the so-
called periphery, as the result of the siphoning off of 
their raw materials and surplus value by the "center," 
namely, Western Europe, the United States, and Japan. While 
unequal developmental theories are not the object of this 
paper, let it suffice to say that this theory has been amply 
criticized for oversimplifying the historical, cultural, and 
economic character of the internal relations of the former 
colonies and their external relations with other countries. 
Furthermore, unequal development theories tend to ignore the 
phenomenal growth of formerly undeveloped countries as 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong, let alone offer an 
explanation for the Republic of China's recent, gradual, but 
sure move to free enterprise. Fanon's account is subject to 
similar criticisms. 
Nevertheless, Fanon does make effective use of 
certain categories of Marxist thought to explain the misery 
of the native people. The following is a passage which 
aptly describes the inequitable distribution of resources 
with the colonial setting; 
The settlers' town is a strongly built town, all 
made of stone and steel. It is a brightly lit 
town; the streets are covered with asphalt, and 
the garbage cans swallow all the leaving, unseen, 
unknown and hardly thought about ... The settlers' 
town is a well-fed town, an easy-going town; its 
belly is always full of good things ... 
The town belonging to the colonized people, or at 
least the native town, the Negro village, the 
medina, the reservation, is a place of ill fame, 
peopled by men of evil repute. They are born 
there, it matters little where or how; they die 
there, it matters not where, nor how. It is a 
world without spaciousness; men live there on top 
of each other, and their huts are built one on top 
of the other. The native town is a hungry town, 
starved of bread, of meat, of shoes, of coal, of 
light.92 
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The lack of food, health care, sanitary living 
conditions, and other goods and services, which injures the 
health and well-being of the native, is a result of the 
socio-economic institutions of the colony. The institutions 
themselves seem to do violence against the native, so we are 
prompted to speak of this as "institutional violence." But 
there is a problem with this expression, which is also a 
problem with Fanon's account of exploitation, namely that we 
do not normally speak of holding institutions responsible 
for violence. Does this mean that no one is responsible? 
If not, then perhaps this phrase is best avoided, and we 
should continue to speak of violence embedded in 
institutions as we have in Chapters One and Two. 
The impact of overt physical violence and violence 
embedded in institutions is worsened, in Fanon's account of 
the colonial situation, by a third kind of injury, 
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psychological injury or injury to the spirit of oppressed 
individuals and peoples. Here again it may seem appropriate 
to speak simply of "psychological violence"; but again there 
is a problem. The problem lies in the fact that 
psychological or spiritual relationships between people do 
not have the definite demarcations that relationships 
between bodies 
definite points, 
easily defined. 
do. Because the latter end in space at 
acts crossing boundaries are relatively 
But healthy and constructive psychological 
or spiritual relationships are no less interactive than 
injurious ones. Calling the latter "violence" appears to 
tell us the nature of the injury when in fact it does not. 
Consequently, it seems better to speak of psychological or 
spiritual injuries or violations of people's dignity. 
Fanon writes extensively of colonialism's 
"neurotic pathology," as he calls it. This is the 
imposition of European customs, values, and traditions at 
the expense of indigenous culture. The native experiences a 
loss of self-worth and identity as the imposition of 
European culture fragments 
patterns of life and culture. 
of indigenous culture as a 
and breaks down traditional 
Fanon views this degradation 
form of violence for it is 
fundamentally injurious to the soul or psyche of the 
native.93 
In Black Skin. White Masks, Fanon's psychological 
work which antedated by two years The Wretched of the Earth, 
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Fanon speaks of the natives internalization of an 
"inferiority complex," precisely the result of the overt and 
covert messages of colonialism: white European culture is 
superior to black African culture. 94 Internalizing this 
inferiority causes psychic alienation, one of the 
fundamental pre-conditions and starting points which lead to 
Fanon's eventual prescription of violent redress. The 
following passage exemplifies in the extreme the messages of 
psychological injury, which, if internalized, lead to 
alienation; 
the settler paints the native as a sort of 
quintessence of evil. Native society is not 
simply described as a society lacking in values. 
The native is declared insensitive to ethics; he 
represents not only the absence of values, but 
also the negation of values. He is, let us dare 
to admit, the enemy of values, and in this sense 
he is absolute evi1.95 
Closely connected with such psychological 
violations of human dignity is racism. According to Fanon, 
for a black person to gain social and economic advantage, he 
or she must wear "white masks"; that is, he or she must 
appropriate the values and customs of the European at the 
expense of his/her own. Moreover, an entire legal and 
constitutional framework, as well as the aforementioned 
military structure, is created to protect and to preserve 
the interests of the colonizer. 
It should be noted that the phsyical, 
institutional, and psychological aspects of "violence in its 
natural state," implied in Fanon's general discussion of the 
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colonial system, are all very much related and inter-
dependent. In Fanon's analysis, the racist and capitalist 
policies of the colonial system, initiated and maintained by 
physical violence, generates of itself injury to both the 
soul and body of the native. It thus creates the 
"atmosphere of violence," cited earlier in Fanon. Indeed, 
it creates, according to Fanon, a situation so thoroughly 
ruled by domination that no rational persuasion nor 
conciliation is possible. 
The two dialectically opposed forces, oppressor 
and oppressed, "follow the principle of mutual exclusivity." 
Their mutual negation in violent conflict eventually 
generates the "new man," that is, the free native. The most 
obvious negation is the settler, which recalls Sartre's 
chilling description of the confrontation between native and 
settler, 
The rebel's weapon is the proof of his humanity. 
For in the first days of the revolt you must kill: 
to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with 
one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he 
oppresses at the same time: there remain a dead 
man, and a free man; the survivor, for the first 
time, feels a national soil under his feet.96 
In Fanon's assumption of dialectical conflict, 
there is more than a little hint of Hegel. In Black Skin, 
White Masks, Fanon recalls the Hegelian dialectic where 
fundamental conflict is the catalyst in the movement toward 
the absolute reciprocity, or mutual recognition, of two 
self-conciousnesses.97 At root here is the moral 
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assumption that recognition is a fundamental human need. As 
long as the black person remains defined by the Other, he is 
unfree, and, Fanon would say, not fully human. "At this 
risk, I would say the black man is not a man. 11 98 In order 
to claim his/her humanity, the black person must make 
herself be recognized, and not merely passively accept the 
paternalistic recognition of the Other. Fanon assumes this 
forceful action of self-assertion must be violent. But in 
fact, forceful self-assertion need not be violent; nor must 
recognition of the black person always be paternalistic. 
Nevertheless, there is in Fanon a clear and 
certain ring of the existential anguish over real human 
responsibility and freedom. Indeed, his concept of 
alienation owes more to Sartre than to Marx: the African 
remains inauthentic as long as she internalizes the 
stereotypes the Other has of her.9 9 For Fanon, freedom is 
the basic moral value, motivation, and goal of his works. 
Though nowhere does he fully explain the nature of freedom, 
he does suggest that it is present in the act of rejecting 
the objectification of oneself.lOO In Hegel, the slave wins 
recognition by turning to the product of his labor; soon the 
Master paradoxically becomes aware of his dependence on the 
slave's productive ability, and the two see themselves as 
mutually recognizing the other.101 For Fanon, however, 
inherent in the colonial situation are such violent 
contradictions that turning to one's labor would only 
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perpetuate the black person's reduction to a thing. The 
African must actively turn to the white man and say "No." 
This action is both an action of freedom--asserting oneself 
over and against the psychic determination of the Other--and 
for freedom, for it removes the obstacles to greater self-
realization, namely, the physical acts, institutional 
structures, and psychological relationships that have caused 
the poverty, injury, and alienation of the native. 
Because the colonial system is so irrationally 
rampant with violence and injury, according to Fanon, 
violence and injury are needed for the creation of the "new 
man." The following is a passage from Black Skin. White 
Masks, in which are clear Fanon's humanist values; 
... man is a yes ... Yes to life. Yes to love. Yes 
to generosity. But man is also a no. No to the 
scorn of man. No to the degradation of man. No 
to the butchery of what is most human in man: 
freedom. 102 
The question of course arises, what does "yes to 
life" and "no to the scorn of man" mean? It certainly could 
be said that Mother Teresa of Calcutta has responded through 
her works among the world-wide poorest of the poor with a 
"yes to life" and a "no" to human degradation. Can a 
dedication to violence, as Fanon implies, win material and 
spiritual liberation for persons and communities? Or is it 
merely a sign pointing to where greater liberation needs to 
occur? Can matching "terror, counter-terror, violence, 
counter-violence," be the formula for building genuine human 
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community, and, in the African case, communities of respect 
between blacks and whites? Fanon does not seriously 
consider other possible answers to these questions. 
Yet, it is Fanon's quest for freedom, given the 
context of the colonial situation, that serves as his 
primary justification for the use of violence. Viewing the 
colonial situation as thoroughly rapacious and unprogressive 
(unlike Marx, who did see colonialism as an essential step, 
however sadly oppressive, in the worldwide socialization of 
productive means), he considered the colonialists to have so 
debased themselves that they have lost touch with 
rationality. By implication, he seems to argue that once 
things have fallen to the level of the irrational, only the 
irrational can effectively counter the irrational. 
According to this view, the enemy had become the incarnation 
of the irrational by using violence and injuring the native 
in every way, and therefore must be restrained or overthrown 
by violence in order to protect the human values of the 
oppressed.103 
Marie Perinbam uses the paradoxical term "holy 
violence" as a metaphor to suggest a "destructive force 
creative beyond belief. 11104 Yet Fanon's commitment to 
violence is, in the end, based on his interpretation of what 
it means to be a free human, as contrasted with the all-
pervasive violation of human dignity in the colonial setting 
and his understanding of the ruling class in Algeria as 
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intransigent and wholly irrational. In fact, seen in the 
context of one-hundred thirty years of resistance against 
the French, when political options had been tried and had 
failed, Fanon's call to revolutionary violence could be 
seen, if we lay aside his inflammatory rhetoric, as an 
application of the principle of self-defense. His message, 
then, would be that we are justified in using physical 
violence to defend basic human rights in the case where 
other options have been tried and have been suppressed. 
Once the commitment to violence has been made, however, it 
appears, given his assumptions, to be total (i.e., in 
relation to the oppressor) , otherwise there would be the 
danger of "nothing but a fancy dress parade ... a few reforms 
at the top ... and down there at the bottom an undivided mass 
endlessly marking time. 11 105 
Fanon cites three "positive and creative" 
qualities to the use of violence. First, the practice of 
violence binds together the different resistance movements 
and creates a "great organism of violence," ready to meet 
the pervasive violence of the settler. This unifying aspect 
of violence apparently breaks down regionalism and tribalism 
as the resistance movement is focussed on the enemy. 
Second, the violent war of liberation introduces in the 
conciousness of the native protagonist ideas of common cause 
and national destiny. Third, Fanon ascribes a therapeutic 
value to the use of violence at the level of the individual. 
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Violence is a "cleansing force." "It frees the native from 
his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; 
it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect. 11 106 
This last attribute recalls Fanon's adaptation of Hegel and 
Sartre mentioned above. 
An evaluation of these assertions of Fanon is in 
order. First, Fanon tends to assert these positive 
qualities as if they are general truths of the property of 
violence. If he suggests a "law-like" character to the 
unifying, regenerative and therapeutic qualities of 
violence, then only one case would suffice to prove it 
false. While others have argued that Fanon did not intend 
to generalize from the case of Algeria, his style does tend 
to suggest that these qualities of violence are universal. 
But a view of the facts regarding violent uprisings shows 
that violence often is not in the least a unifying force, 
either for the people as a whole or even for revolutionary 
organizations. Examples of the violent responses made by 
groups in Lebanon and Central America reveal that power 
politics and fragmentation 
fronts, confusing both the 
often plague revolutionary 
issues and strategies in the 
fight for freedom. Lawrence Stone writes, too, that the use 
of violence is, in more cases than not, self-defeating, as 
it generates bitter divisions and enmity causing social 
cleavages that may take between seventy to one-hundred fifty 
years to be healed.107 This is similar to the criticism 
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made in the analysis of Lenin's prescription of violence. A 
thoughtful assessment of all the material and psychological 
costs needs to be made before the simple emotional appeal to 
"justice" and "liberation." 
Furthermore, it may not be "violence" at all that 
is the unifying attribute that Fanon has in mind. Instead, 
as Adele Jinadu suggests, the "need for social change" may 
be a more correct account of the catalyzing force in such 
political movements. I think Jinadu is correct, especially 
in the face of the obvious divisive tendencies in the use of 
violence. If Fanon wrongly identifies the principal 
unifying element in the struggle for liberation, as I think 
he does, then his conclusion to the imperative of violence 
needs to be called into question. 
The role of violence as an effective means of 
conflict resolution has been seriously questioned by 
psychiatrists as well. Erich Fromm, the German 
psychoanalyst, writes, 
Any glorification of violence is not only 
dangerous, it is based on untruth... Killing is 
never leads to the realization of what is human. 
Killing is always a violation of what is human, 
both in the killer and in the killed. It is 
condoned by many as being in the service of life, 
but it must always be atoned for because it always 
is a crime against life; it always hardens the 
heart of the killer, it always violates 
humanity.l08 
Fromm's statement contains its own moral 
assumptions, principally, that humans are essentially 
relational beings oriented toward life and life-giving 
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activity. Yet, his work as a psychiatrist has given him 
ample case histories to give credence to his assumptions. 
Other psychiatrists have also cited the negative effect of 
violence on the perpetrators of violence, not to mention the 
victims of violence, on whom the ill effects are all too 
obvious.109 Some conclusions seem to be that violence 
committed on the part of the perpetrator tends to generate 
feelings of self-hatred and hatred for the other, 
brutalization of the psyche, insensitivity, and contempt. 
These negative psychological effects seem to hold true both 
for urban crime and war time violence. 
J. Glenn Gray writes that upon crossing a field 
after battle, the experience of being "oppressed by a spirit 
of evil" was palpable. He baldly suggests the enduring 
appeal of battle and war is not just comradeship, which 
might be likened to Fanon's sense of solidarity or common 
cause, but the raw delight in destruction as soldiers lose 
themselves in the fury for survival. He quotes a soldier in 
World War One; 
I was boiling with mad rage, which had taken 
holdof me and all the others in an unspeakable 
fashion. The overwhelming wish to kill gave wings 
to my feet. Rage pressed bitter tears from my 
eyes. The monstrous desire for annihilation which 
hovered over the battlefield thickened the brains 
of the men and submerged them in a red fog. . . A 
neutral observer might have perhaps believed that 
we were seized by an excess of happiness.110 
Astonishingly, this kind of brutalization of the 
human psyche is reported by Fanon himself in a chapter 
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titled, "Colonial Wars and Mental Disorders." In it, he 
details the emotional pathologies of both French soldiers 
and Algerian revolutionaries. The evidence he records 
clearly indicate that there is a high cost in the use of 
physical violence to the perpetrator of violent acts. This 
suggests that there must have been a profound internal 
conflict between Fanon, the clinician dedicated to health 
care, and Fanon, the political philosopher. In his calculus 
of values, based on his moral and factual assumptions in 
Algeria, Fanon the political philosopher needed to overrule 
Fanon the psychiatrist. Marie Perinbam suggests there may 
have been a high personal cost to Fanon in this choice. 
Apparently, in the years preceding his death, Fanon became 
withdrawn, hostile, and belligerent, as if personally 
incarnating the very qualities he advocated.111 
Another criticism that can be levied against 
Fanon's argument focuses on his assumptions about the 
colonial situation. His option for violence is surely in 
accord with Lenin's theory of the just wars of national 
independence. Yet, Fanon concludes to the prescription of 
violence by characterizing the antagonists in categorical 
terms. Whites are the oppressors, blacks are the oppressed. 
Whites, in effect, have lost touch with their humanity and 
rationality in their infusing of patterns of degradation and 
violence into the very fabric of the colonial system. They 
are, in effect, inhuman; this loss of humanity grants them 
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permission and justification to use physical violence to 
overcome them. It is precisely this kind of dangerous logic 
and rhetoric which has contributed in no small part to such 
moral catastrophes as, for example, World War One, when 
propaganda fueled the myth of the "monstrous Hun." 
Three further comments are in order. First, 
according to Fanon's logic, the colonial system so corrupts 
the white person that any and all whites are stained, as, 
conversely, any and all blacks are its victims. The 
implicit logic of this train of thought runs to the absurd 
conclusion aptly drawn by Michael Walzer in his book, Just 
and Uniust Wars: European children become appropriate and 
legitimate targets for the violence necessary for the 
therapeutic cleansing and social liberation of the 
African.112 Such a conclusion is likely to offend even the 
most callous moral intuitions. 
Probably one of the most impossible tasks for an 
individual or a community is to determine or judge the 
extent to which another person or group has entirely lost 
touch with their humanity. When does a person or a group 
become "inhuman?" By contrast, the basic assumption in 
Gandhi's philosophy is that people can never completely lose 
their humanity. "Their humanity may be distored by 
ideology, warped by a desire for power, obscured by habits 
of violence, but it is always there. 11113 Even the mental 
disorders of the French torturers and the callousness of 
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Algerian revolutionaries seem to be the body/soul's way of 
saying, "You are not meant to inflict pain on others." 
Because we know both that the measurement of a person's 
humanity is nearly an impossible task, and that the 
infliction of pain upon another has enormous physical and 
psychological consequences for both the victim and the 
perpetrator of violence, it may be well to proceed under the 
assumption that no person ever is totally corrupted of his 
humanity. 
A second comment on Fanon' s characterization of 
the colonies is in order. Fanon writes as if there are only 
two racial protagonists, Blacks and Whites. However, the 
mode of social stratification appears to be more complex, 
and includes Arabs and Asians. The consequent social 
structure is less of a monolith. The colonial situation 
then is "ethnically split and spiritually divided," as the 
members of varying groups experience different levels of 
commitment, either to colonialism or to the struggle for 
liberation. 114 Since Fanon' s call to violence is largely 
based on the assumption of two separate camps of competing 
rivalries, the factual complexity of both racial groups and 
their commitments and values necessarily introduces a 
mitigating factor to Fanon's appeal. 
A third comment on Fanon's characterization of the 
colonial situation. Fanon adapts Marx and Lenin in his 
assessment of the colonies and holds that the peasantry and 
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the lumpenproletariat, the unemployed urban workers (held 
with great suspicion by Marx), were the truly revolutionary 
class. However, after Algeria won its independence, the 
peasantry appears not to have galvanized the country in 
revolutionary ideology, but have returned to their former 
ways: 
The peasants, for their part, have not proven to 
be as revolutionary as they were during the war of 
independence. They have not agitated to obtain an 
agrarian reform or to force the government to give 
more attention to their problems.115 
This suggests an all too easy tendency to 
overestimate the virtues of the new society and to 
underestimate human imperfections and limitations. In owing 
a debt to Marx and Lenin, Fanon shares the same risks of 
reductionism and absolutization mentioned to in the analysis 
of Lenin. These tendencies in his analysis and rhetoric 
seem to make the use of violence a more readily accessible 
option; for both "the enemy" and "the goal of the oppressed" 
each are treated as unambiguous terms. Yet, in real life 
things are rarely unambiguous. Systems do not always work, 
and all people, black, white, capitalist, socialist, are 
prone alike to movements toward life and generativity and to 
temptations to selfishness, power, greed, or corruption. 
Unfortunately, it is the very self-assured 
certainty of the two great ideologies of capitalism and 
socialism which has led to the spilling of so much blood in 
recent history. Albert Camus raised precisely this point it 
his striking text, Neither Victims Nor Executioners. 
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Both 
capitalism and socialism promise great individual and social 
advantages but at a sure and high cost: some persons must 
die. Camus argues for a kind of Copernican rethinking; by 
placing as our priority human lives, and not the 
establishment of certain socio-economic systems, we risk not 
knowing what the future will bring. But we will know one 
thing, and this due to our priority established in policy: 
we will not kill.116 
Lenin and Fanon both operate under the assumption 
that socialism will definitively eliminate poverty and 
oppression. They justify their call to violence on the 
grounds of the economic oppression and physical repression 
sufferred by the oppressed class. In Fanon's case, there 
is the added crisis of the existential alienation of the 
black person; that is, that the very humanity of the African 
is jeopardized by the presence of racist, colonialist, and 
capitalist institutions. While socialists like Leninand 
Fanon often have rightly noted, described, and analyzed 
mechanisms of violence and exploitation in socio-economic 
systems, the evidence at hand suggests that the creation of 
new systems does not gaurantee the elimination of severe 
social and economic difficulties. In addition, the option 
for violence often exacerbates those difficulties. 
This section has uncovered the moral and factual 
assumptions in Fanon's appeal to violence, as well as 
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determining the implicit logic in his appeal. Fanon, using 
both marxist and existentialist categories, views violence 
as dialectically necessary for the winning of the freedom 
and genuine humanity of the black person. He ascribes 
positive and therapeutic qualities to the role of violence 
in independence movements. I have offered a variety of 
criticisms based on certain empirical and logical 
considerations vis-a-vis the moral and factual assumptions 
in Fanon's appeal to violence. To conclude, there is an 
extreme danger in negating the very values liberationists 
hope to achieve in the new society when the option of 
violence is readily promoted as historically inevitable, 
psychically necessary, and morally acceptable in the face of 
a portrayed inhuman opponent. 
Chapter IV 
Conclusions 
This essay has examined the moral and factual 
assumptions in the appeals to non-violence and violence in 
four charismatic thinkers representing two traditions of 
response to political, economic, and spiritual ills. It has 
analyzed and evaluated many of these assumptions as well as 
the implicit logic of their charismatic appeals either to 
violence or to non-violence. Some concluding considerations 
are in order, as well as directions pointing to the need for 
further study in the areas of non-violence and political 
change. 
First, each of the appeals of the four thinkers we 
have studied presumes a certain philosophical or theological 
anthropology. Furthermore, it is assumed that the human 
person or community will realize inner and social harmony 
when responsibility for acting on this implicit or explicit 
anthropology is accepted. For Fanon, man is essentially 
free, and needs to assert and to act for freedom to 
establish his humanity. Where severe obstacles impede this 
natural drive for identity and freedom, violence is a 
necessary and even creative act. For Lenin, borrowing from 
Marx, man is a free, creative, producer, yet enslaved by 
capitalism. In order to enjoy the fullest realization of 
human freedom and creativity, violence is the necessary 
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means to overcome both the slavery of capitalism and the 
inevitable resistance of reactionary forces. 
An apt description of Tolstoy's anthropology might 
borrow from Karl Rahner. For Tolstoy, man is being-in-
relation-to-God, and, as such, is able to determine his 
moral principles from the life and example of Christ. His 
experience of God led Tolstoy to a radical interpretation of 
the Sermon on the Mount. His principles for action--you 
shall not kill, return no injury with injury, offer no 
resistance to the wicked--strike most people as difficult 
enough options in the occasional personal conflicts that 
arise. Translating these principles into public policy 
appears virtually impossible, given both the extraordinary 
tasks of directing and sustaining an extremely broad social 
and political community and the differences in moral 
development among persons in that community. Gandhi, 
however, was able to enjoy modest successes in teaching, 
mostly by example, the virtues of non-violence to large 
masses of people. Like Tolstoy, Gandhi experienced God as 
a personal Creator and Sustainer. He held a moral 
epistemology, as it were, in which he identified truth as 
that which lives or gives life. As Gandhi and Tolstoy 
derived most of their principles for action from the 
fundamental experience of God, a brief consideration of the 
role of religion in violent or non-violent revolutionary 
movements is in order. 
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A cursory scan of history suggests that religion's 
role in political movements is often very ambiguous. It 
appears that every positive contribution religion has made 
to social and political conflicts has been cancelled out by 
an equal negative one. On the one hand, for example there 
are the examples of St. Francis, St. Martin de Porres, the 
Hindu and Buddhist saints, the holy ones of Judaism, the 
Mennonites, the Quakers, and others. On the other hand, 
there have been the crusades, the fanaticism of certain 
Muslim sects, the identification of the sword and the cross 
in Latin America, and other abuses. It appears that 
religion can no more offer definitive guidance than can 
other programs or strategies. Further, religion does not 
remove us from the pain of moral choices, nor from the pain 
of doing good work. It appears that religion's best 
contribution, while we work out the anguishing moral choices 
we sometimes need to make, is the revelation that we are 
loved by our Creator and we are related one to another. 
From this consideration does not follow at all an exhaustive 
set of principles for action, but it does shed light upon a 
general pattern of responses that fosters relatedness and 
community; this pattern would include actions that care for 
one's neighbor and generally supports the health and welfare 
of the community. general welfare 
Religion's influence on Tolstoy and Gandhi has 
been documented in chapter two of this essay. Lenin, on the 
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other hand, considered religion to be socially harmful. He 
not only viewed it, as Marx did, as a symptom of an 
alienated society, but worse, as drug imposed by the 
oppressors to lull the oppressed into submission. 117 For 
Lenin, Marxism "is relentlessly hostile to religion," 
because of the insidious use of it in the hands of the 
bourgeoisie. Thus, he writes, "Every religious idea, every 
idea of a god, even every flirtation with the idea of god is 
unutterable vileness; ... it is vileness of the most dangerous 
kind."118 The more progressive and enlightened the 
religion, the more dangerous it was in Lenin's view. 
Indeed, he excoriated Tolstoy as nothing more than a cleric 
with progressive ideas, the worst kind, in Lenin's 
estimation; 
•.• we have the preaching of one of the most 
abominable things on earth--relgion, the endeavor 
to replace priest officially appointed by priests 
who are priests by moral convicition, i.e., the 
cultivation of the most subtle, and therefore 
particularly disgusting, clericalism.119 
The assumption here is that religion and socialism, or, 
religion and full human realization, are mutually exclusive 
terms. Here, the anthropologies clash. While in this era 
there certainly have been many theologians and socialists 
who have been studying the common ground between the two 
world views, the arguments in Lenin appear to afford neither 
dialogue nor discussion. 
Fanon criticizes religion in similar terms as 
Lenin; 
The colonialist bourgeosie is helped in its work 
of calming down the natives by inevitable 
religion. All those saints who have turned the 
other cheek, who have forgiven trespasses against 
them, and who have been spat on and insulted with 
shrinking are studied and held up as examples.120 
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Fanon shares the same assumption as Lenin, namely, that 
religion is reactionary and unprogressive, forever aligned 
with the oppressive bourgeoisie. But Lenin's critic ism is 
even harsher, seeming to absolutely preclude in religion any 
positive moral contribution. There appears no way to 
circumvent Lenin's criticism; so thoroughly convinced is he 
of his view of the human person and society that any idea 
apart from his is a lie, deception, and heresy. There is, 
for Lenin, no arguing either for the existence of God or for 
the redeeming effects of religion. 
In Fanon and Lenin, positive values of human 
freedom and community are the goals of human action. 
Violence is argued implicitly and explicitly as the 
necessary means to these goals. Yet, the question remains 
how much of the goal is cancelled out by the use of the 
means. Thus, Nikolai Berdyaev writes, 
Revolution seeks triumph at all costs .... Triumph 
is achieved by force. This force inevitably turns 
into violence. There is a fateful mistake of the 
makers of revolution which is connected with ther 
relation to time. The present is regarded 
exclusively as a means, the future as an 
end .... But the future which the exalted end was to 
be realized never comes. In it there will again 
be those same repulsive means. Violence never 
leads to freedom. Hatred never leads to 
brotherhood.121 
85 
While Berdyaev is not completely accurate--
violence led to freedom for the thirteen U.S. colonies in 
1776, for example--his overall point returns us again to the 
consideration of means and the ends for our charismatic 
thinkers. If a legitimate goal of justice and freedom is 
held up, how absolutely important is the goal in relation to 
the means? The danger exists, in the practice of the means, 
in partially or entirely negating the goal. 
Fanon, for example, considered hatred an essential 
component to the revolutionary fervor needed to achieve 
victory for the oppressed. Yet, hatred has clear negative 
consequences for the person who hates.122 Nevertheless, Che 
Guevara, in following Fanon's principles, remarks that 
hatred must be considered an essential factor in the 
struggle; "intransigent hatred which impels one to exceed 
the natural limitations of the human being and transforms 
him into an effective, violent, selective, and cold killing 
machine. 11 123 Yielding to such passions, warned against by 
advocates of religion yet often not demonstrated in 
practice, appears to negate the positive goals of community 
by generating an attitude that adamantly refuses 
reconciliation and healing. 
If religion leaves an ambiguous legacy in its 
contribution in thought and deed to questions of violence 
and non-violence in the movement toward social change, an 
area of study that may prove helpful in providing insight to 
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these questions is the rational grounding of an ethic of 
non-violence based on a philosophical undertanding of the 
human person and human community. 
A preliminary grounding for this ethic would 
essentially include a view of the human person and, in 
addition, a view of the human community. For we are related 
to one another. As individuals, we are persons of hopes, 
dreams, loves, joys, sorrows, sadnessess. But we also 
share, no matter how culturally different we may be, these 
common experiences of our humanity. Furthermore, this 
common humanity leads to common projects; everything from 
the simplest enterprise to the most complex--say, from 
little league baseball to inter-stellar exploration--reflect 
common interests, play, curiosity, and wonder. We discover 
that we become invested in one another; we need each other 
to help us to achieve our hopes and dreams as well to help 
give understanding and meaning to countless events in our 
lives. In a very real sense, then, we are truly related to 
one another. 
However, the experience of physical 
violence--kicking, stabbing, punching, strafing, 
bombing---and injurious psychological relationships--threat-
ening, manipulating--destroys and damages this natural 
relatedness between persons, groups and nations. Violence, 
in the words of Simone Weil, turns the "other into thing." 
With this understanding of violence then, there would seem 
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to be at least a prima facie case against the justifiability 
of violence in human relations on the grounds of the 
pre-eminent value of the human personality. Thus the burden 
of proof about the justification of the use of violence will 
be with those who say that violence is acceptable, and not 
with those who say that violence is wrong. 
It may be argued that being violent is not only 
obviously evil and damaging to the victim, but also to the 
agent of violence. Indeed, depending on how the victim 
responds to the violence, the experience of violence at 
times can even paradoxically deepen the nobility of the 
attacked person; postive moral values as courage, 
perseverance, mercy, and self-sacrifice may be the lived 
responses of the attacked person. However, it is often the 
case, as Fanon himself reported in his text, that the agent 
of violence often becomes a victim of violence as well. For 
in yielding to violence not only is the victim disvalued, 
but a brutalization and de-humanization of the agent occurs 
as well. The common human measure of the worth of every 
human being is lost or cancelled in violent exchange. 
It is only in and through relationship that we 
gain understanding of our own individuality. But violence 
assaults this coexistence and cohabitation, and feeds 
isolation and narcissism.124 As Sergio Cotta says, 
"violence dissolves coexistence into material dominance. 11 125 
The violent person in the end is formed by the habits of 
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violence; the rupture of relations he causes harms himself, 
and this rupture needs to be healed for him to continue 
growing as a human person. Non-violence offers the 
possibility for that healing and transformation in that it 
calls forth and nurtures the core humanity in each person, 
even the most brutalized opponent. A philosophic ethic on 
non-violence might begin here. 
Several illustrations of the proposal that we are 
oriented more toward the life and generativity presumed in 
non-violence than the destructive tendencies inherent in 
violence will be useful. The first is the astounding report 
of a World War Two general who discovered that of all front 
line soldiers, only twenty-five percent actually aimed and 
fired their weapons at the "enemy." The general, S. L.A. 
Marshall, viewed this as a testimony to a powerful natural 
prejudice against the use of force intended to kill or 
injure, and, as a matter of fact, a prejudice the Army 
needed to diminish or eliminate in order to be an effective 
fighting force.126 This amazing report seems to confirm 
what British pacifist Vera Brittain said in 1948, that she 
retained the "unfailing conviction that even in the midst of 
war there is love between peoples, bonds of humanity which 
the virulent propaganda can only temporarily submerge. 11 127 
Roy Finch writes of an anarchist who felt the 
"bond of suffering" with the victim of his assassination 
attempt, "For an instant a strange feeling, as of shame, 
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comes over me; but the next moment I am filled with anger at 
the sentiment, so unworthy of a revolutionist. With defiant 
hatred I look him full in the face. n128 This rejection of 
empathetic feeling is a rejection of a common humanity, and, 
in the end, may do more harm both to the individual who 
chooses the violent option and to the cause for which he is 
struggling. 
This preliminary case for non-violence needs much 
more study and work. At the same time, it needs to take 
seriously the serious crises in political relations where 
non-violence may be seen to presume a heroism and self-
sacrifice far beyond the capacities of most people. This 
always has been at the heart of most criticisms of non-
violence. Furthermore, leaders of non-violence need to be 
idealistic enough, yet at the same time shrewd enough to 
manoever in complex political situations so that when the 
crisis is at its peak, the project is not abandoned to the 
Stalins and Robespierres who completely divorce the means 
from the ends.129 If persons as Tolstoy and Gandhi are 
revolutionary, it is because they act completely within the 
realm of the present. They are about effecting both the 
revolution of the human spirit and, subsequently, the 
construction of the good society. This recalls Martin 
Buber's apt phrase, namely, that if a revolution is to give 
birth to a new society there must first be a conception and 
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gestation; you don't get a new society from an empty 
womb.130 
The immediacy of Tolstoy's and Gandhi's thought is 
found in the implicit logic of their formulae. When we live 
in harmony as brothers and sisters, then wars will end. The 
responsibility rests on individuals and communities now. In 
Lenin and to a lesser extent Fanon, however, the process is 
one step removed. When we arrive at socialism, we will live 
in harmony and wars will cease. The difficulty remains in 
assuming that socialism, or, in Fanon's case, nationalist 
independence, is the supreme or absolute goal, thereby 
reducing the importance of the means to that goal. Non-
violence proposes first, as an immediate goal, the 
construction of a good society. Second, as a strategy of 
political action along the lines of Gandhian methodology, it 
proposes as much or more attention to the means of action as 
to the goal of action; as such it reduces the risk, present 
in Fanon and Lenin, of the cancellation of the positive 
aspirations of the goal by the negative actions of the 
means. 
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